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Marcus Tul l ius Cicero was a pivotal character in  the transitional  period 
from the end of the Roman Republ ic to the beg inn ing of what was to become the 
Roman Empire .  His contribution to our  modern knowledge of Roman h istory, 
mores, jud icial practices, the dai ly l ives of the patrician class and more is 
invaluable .  More than any other  Roman,  he left us with a breathing account of 
l ife in h is times, through h is correspondence with friends, fami ly and associates, 
his many pol itical and ph i losophica l doctrines and ,  of course, h is speeches in the 
Senate and trial courts of Rome. Cicero was bri l l iant, clever and funny and , yet, 
prone to uncontrol lable ego and shocking ly bad pol itical choices and decisions. 
These political errors are crucial to Cicero's u lt imate decision to return to active 
pol itical l ife and leadership in 44 B .C .  after the assassination of Ju l ius Caesar, 
including the del ivery of fou rteen extant Phi l ippics against Marcus Antonius,  a 
decis ion which led to h is own execution .  Th is paper examines the behavior and 
actions of a man who on ly wanted to recapture the earl ier g lory of h is consular 
year, 63 B . C . ,  but who inevitably seemed to always take the wrong cou rse. 
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On March 1 5 , 44 B . C . ,  1 Ju l ius Caesar was assassinated . A nominal  Republ ic, 
shaken for years by chal lenges to its rules and laws, was once again th rown into 
2 
turmoi l .  Rome's future was at stake and no one knew how to respond: not the Senate ,  
nor  its consul ,  nor  the conspirators nor the Roman people . I n  the immed iate aftermath 
of the murder, Rome was paralyzed . I n  44, Marcus Antonius was Caesar's co-consul 
and , therefore , h is obvious successor and remain ing lead ing citizen .  Since he was not 
a participant in the plot, he had been detained outside the Senate whi le the deed was 
taking place .  As soon as he real ized what had occu rred , unsure of his own fate, he 
immediately fled rather than seize the reins in the resu ltant furor. I nstead of declaring 
themselves saviors of the Republ ic and al leviating fear, the assassins ,  Caesar's fellow 
senators, many of whom had been h is l ifelong friends, also fled . Panic and 
pandemonium ensued. From that moment on,  Rome (or at least those who upheld the 
old constitution) fought for her l ife , naively trying to defend and preserve an ideal form of 
government that had virtual ly d isappeared. F inally, the formation of the Second 
Triumvirate in  43 was the veritable death knell for restoring the Republ ic that had once 
existed . 
Once calm had been restored ,  amnesty granted , and compromise reached , for 
approximately two months fol lowing Caesar's death , Antonius seemed to be acting 
moderately towards the assassins and showing deference to the Senate. He proposed 
that Caesar's acta be approved , that the assassins go unpun ished , but not praised , that 
Dolabella be appointed co-consul in accordance with Caesar's wishes, and that an 
atmosphere of compromise prevai l .  Frisch bel ieves that th is  pol icy placed Antonius in a 
1 Hereafter, a l l  dates are B . C .  un less otherwise noted . 
position of almost absolute power wh ich , in  the opin ion of many of h is countrymen,  he 
abused2 . Antonius' subsequent behavior became the u ltimate provocation for the 
fourteen extant speeches that are known as Marcus Tu l l ius Cicero's Philippics, a 
n ickname based on Demosthenes' speeches against Phi l ip  of Macedon .  
This thesis wi l l examine Cicero's motivation ,  in 44-43 ,  for undertaking the 
leadership role that u lt imately led to his execution . I t  wi l l  investigate h is escalating 
hatred and vitriol for Marcus Anton ius, h is strong a l legiance to and promotion of 
Octavian ,  and h is decision to re-enter active pol itical l ife , in effect, to take the helm of 
the slowly sinking ship that was the Roman Republ ic in 44-43.  The questions posed 
here are whether Cicero's behavior was courageous and selfless, without regard for h is 
3 
own life , believing that he could restore the Republ ic for the people of Rome or whether 
he had personal and u lterior motives for inciting a civi l  war. Another issue is whether 
C icero continued to act rational ly as the situation escalated or whether his abi l ity to see 
th ings clearly was affected by h is knowledge that he had undertaken a lost cause. 
CICERO: BRIEF BACKGROUND WITH REFERENCE TO PHILIPPICS 
Cicero ,  who had been consul  in 63 B . C . ,  had not held a real position of influence 
at Rome for almost twenty years. Nevertheless, he remained involved and interested in 
activities in  public l ife . At fi rst he applauded the pol icy of compromise, singing its 
praises in terms l ike amnestia and oblivia sempitema. Frisch bel ieves that in the days 
d i rectly after the murder, Cicero even considered collaborating with Anton ius, a lthough 
2 Hartvig Frisch , Cicero's Fight for the Republic: The Historical Background of Cicero's Philippics (Copen hagen: 
Glydendal ,  1 946) 56. 
he does not ind icate what form that col laboration would take.3 However, by Apri l ,  
Cicero had become angri ly d isappointed with the conspirators' behavior and was 
lamenting the fact that Rome was under the control of Antonius and Dolabella, the 
consuls chosen by Caesar, not the people.4 He had become aware of Antonius' 
questionable and,  to C icero, i l legal actions in both Rome and the provinces. He 
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vacil lated for months as to whether or  not he should retu rn to Rome, knowing that when 
he did ,  he would be taking on Antonius .5 He u lt imately decided that his place was in 
the Senate, and return ing to Rome on August 3 1 , 44, with in  weeks assumed a position 
of leadership such as he had not held since the days of h is consulship.6 
Posterity is fortunate that Cicero was a prol ific writer and much of what he wrote 
in that crucial period remains.  However, h is words,  actions and decisions du ring the 
period after Caesar's death are open to interpretation and debate . Dickinson states that 
Cicero was not moved by a desire for power or money.7 Shackleton-Bai ley says that no 
one wi l l  everknow "after what private hesitations Cicero set foot on the fatal ladder."8 
He bel ieves that C icero ,  aware of the risk and exh ibit ing g reat courage, may have had 
an u rge for "primacy . . .  not l ike Caesar or  Pompey, but as he had sa id , 'equal ity in 
freedom, primacy in  esteem ."'9 M itchel l  insists that Cicero was not seeking a leadership 
role in a restored Republ ic because he knew he was too old . He would content h imself 
with the prestige that came with his consular status since he real ly had no strategy for 
3 Frisch 1 1 9 .  
4 Att. 14.6.2, 14.9.2 and 14.1 0.1. 
5 Frisch 1 22.  
6 Frisch 1 26 .  
7 John Dickinson, Death o f  a Republic: Political Thought a t  Rome 59-44 B. C. (New York: Macmi l la n ,  1 963) 44. 
8 D.R. Shackleton Bailey, Cicero (New York: Scribner, 1 97 1 )  246-249. 
9 Shackleton Bai ley 246-249. 
saving the Republic nor any actions he could suggest to the conspirators. 1° F risch 
concurs ,  stating that Cicero's wil lingness to become the leader of the Republican 
opposition in the Senate exhibited his cou rage to lead the fight  to save liberty, even if it 
was at personal expense . 11 
I t  would appear, therefore , that Cicero's ostensible motivation was to rescue and 
restore the Republic. Everitt emphasizes that Cicero was the right man for the job . He 
5 
was one of the few senior statesmen who had survived recent political tu rmoi l ,  therefore 
representing "the best of the past. "12 
He was known for advocating peace and reconci liation throughout h is career. 
He also possessed the expertise , both admin istrative and rhetorical ,  to regain his old 
political influence. Everitt a l ludes to a personality sh ift that exhibited a new 
"ruth lessness and clarity" which could have been due to his advanced age and an 
attitude of having noth ing to lose. Everitt a lso suggests that  Cicero's years spent 
read ing and writing ph ilosophy might have helped him clarify his priorities. Therefore ,  
the Cicero who returned to  politics was in effect a new person who was now wil l ing to 
use "unscrupu lous and even unconstitutional methods" to ach ieve h is goal :  "the fu l l ,  
complete and permanent restoration of the Republic."13 
Syme, no partisan of Cicero's, provides a fresh perspective on Cicero and his 
attacks on Marcus Antonius .  He bel ieves that historians rely too much on the Philippics, 
and that the lens should be adjusted without their influence .14  In  Syme's opin ion ,  
1 0  Thomas N. Mitchel l ,  Cicero, the Senior Statesman (New Haven: Yale U P ,  1 99 1 )  299. 
11  Frisch 9. 
1 2  Anthony Everitt, Cicero: The Life and Times of Rome's Greatest Politician (New York: Random House, 200 1 )  287. 
13 Everitt 287. 
1 4  Ronald Syme, The Roman Revolution (London: Oxford U P ,  1 95 1 )  1 05. 
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Cicero's last year, although "fu l l  of g lory and eloquence", was a d isaster for Rome.15 To 
Syme, Cicero's political judgment was frequently questionable.16  Syme's criticism of 
Cicero and his motives is damning .  He accuses him of exhibiting a fanaticism upon h is 
retu rn to Rome in 44 that could on ly have been a result of the memory of past 
"humiliations" : h is exi le ,  the role he was forced to play during the First Triumvirate as a 
puppet of the despots, and later Caesar, defending people he despised , his 
miscalculation in siding with Pompey during the civi l war; and ,  final ly ,  according to 
Syme, "the gui lty knowledge of his own inadequacy . "  Syme accuses Cicero , a lthough · 
greatly talented , of having done much less for the Republic du ring h is career than his 
speeches professed . Cicero also knew that he should never have left Rome after 
March 1 7 , when h is talents might tru ly have served to bring about "concord and ordered 
government."17  Instead ,  he deserted Rome, vacil lating about what to do,  as was h is 
wont. Syme states that by the time he returned in the autumn ,  it was too late. When he 
final ly decided to join the fray, he incited what Syme cal ls "the most irrational of all civil 
wars , "  instead of working towards some kind of peace .18 
There is no question that the Philippics exhibit a continuous escalation in 
Cicero's anger and hatred towards Marcus Antonius and a certain increased fanaticism 
in h is style. There is an almost manic tone in some of the Philippics, and Frisch 
believes that Cicero was a "man ia-depressive <sic>" character.19  Therefore ,  it is 
essential to investigate how Cicero came to be on his second threshold of greatness in  
1 5  Syme 4 .  
1 6  Syme 1 42.  
1 7  Syme 1 44. 
1 8  Syme 1 39. 
19 Frisch 1 5 . 
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44. The clues l ie in  the career that created the man who,  at the age of 63 ,  was wi l l ing to 
take on this dangerous chal lenge. 
POLITICAL BACKGROUND/POLITICAL ERRORS? 
CICERO'S CONSULSHIP AND CATILINE 
. Cicero was born in Arpin um in 1 06 .  He was an eques, a novus homo, not born 
to the aristocracy and ,  therefore , h is rise to power at Rome in  h is early career took extra 
effort and cleverness since he cou ld never be accepted as one of the true optimates, 
the properly born rul ing class. Nonetheless, he ran through the cursus honorum and 
u ltimately became consul  in 63.2° F rom that point on ,  h is pol itical career is fraught with 
indecis ive and questionable choices, several of which seem to have been reached 
because he put his ego before common sense; others because, a lthough extremely 
bright and clever, he d id not possess the savvy and innate ruth lessness of a true 
pol itician .  I t  has been suggested that, had he been born in another era ,  C icero would 
have l ived h is l ife in  an ivory tower outside the pol itical arena,  read ing,  writing and 
teach ing ph i losophy and law.21 However, th is was not a possibi l ity in Cicero's l ifetime 
and the route that he traveled , although more ard uous for an eques, was the expected 
course in order to ach ieve success. H is own ph i losophy speaks of the ideal statesman 
and h is responsibi l ities to the people and the state . Nonetheless, there appears to have 
been a certain naivete in C icero's th inking,  probably because he bel ieved in the innate 
goodness of man.22 
20 El izabeth Rawson, Cicero: A Portrait (Ithaca: Cornel l  U P ,  1 983) 6 1 . 
21 Frisch 1 5 . 
22 Dickinson 46. 
8 
Cicero's consulship became famous for h is very successfu l suppression of the 
Cati l inarian conspiracy. The decision that came back to haunt him throughout the rest 
of h is l ife was having the conspirators executed without tria l ,  a un i lateral power inherent 
in  the Senatus consultum ultimum. Cicero considered h is actions during his consu lsh ip 
as the g reatest ach ievement of his career and they were celebrated by a l l ,  giving h im 
the title pater patriae for having saved h is country .  However, several years later he paid 
for that decision with exile and , even after his return , frequently felt compelled to defend 
h is actions. He insisted that, although he had been g iven the power to decide how to 
defend the Republic, he had consu lted with the Senate before taking action and had 
been backed by them .23 In terestingly,  in  the debate d iscussing the fate of the 
conspirators , Ju l ius Caesar advocated l ife in  prison or  exi le, wh ile Cato the Younger 
argued strongly for the death penalty .24 
Rawson ,  in her biography of C icero , says that from the moment Cicero's 
consulship ended , Cicero's pol itical l ife became a political fa i lure .25 She criticizes his 
desire for constant praise but recogn izes that a novus homo would have more need for 
this ,  s ince dignitas and publ ic recogn ition were not automatical ly h is .  However, she 
states that Cicero was incapable of holding h is tongue and, therefore , made people 
bel ieve that he lacked the gravitas for leadership .  Cicero also needed to keep 
reminding Rome of the role he had played d u ring h is consulship to ward off 
repercussions from h is execution of the conspirators .26 His actions du ring his 
consu lsh ip certain ly prove that gravitas was not an issue. However, despite h is justified 
23 P lut. , Cic. 20-21. 
24 S uet., /u/. 1 4: Sal l . , Cat. 51. 
25 Rawson 89. 
2 6  Rawson 9 1 . 
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pride in  the actions he bel ieved had saved h is country, he was correct that h is treatment 
of the Cati l inarians would return to bite h im.  
CICERO, THE BONA DEA SCANDAL A N D  CLODIUS: DUBIOUS CHOICES? 
U nfortunately for C icero , h is next political error immediately fol lowed his 
consulship .  I n  62 B . C . ,  the famous Bona Dea scandal occurred . The mysteries of the 
Bona Dea , a strictly female rel igious rite , were celebrated annual ly at the home of the 
wife of the pontifex maximus who,  at the t ime, was Ju l ius Caesar. The perpetrator, 
Publ ius Claudius Pu lcher, later known as Clod ius, was a rather d issolute young man, a 
member of a g roup of simi larly incl ined youths. H uzar say that Marcus Antonius may 
also have been a member of this g roup of youths that Cicero had once dubbed the 
'Cati l ine set . '27 C lodius was purported to be having an affair  with Pompeia,  Caesar's 
wife . Disgu ised as a woman,  Clod ius managed to crash the party but was d iscovered 
and fled . However, he was recognized , identified and ,  in 6 1 , brought to tria l .28 Although 
gu i lty, he managed to bribe the jury and was acqu itted . H is defense was that he had 
not been in Rome on the date of the ceremony. C icero ,  however, had seen him on that 
day in  Rome because C lodius had come to visit h im .  Epstein bel ieves that that visit is 
proof of an ongoing early friendship between C lodius and Cicero .  Nonetheless, Cicero 
u lt imately decided to testify against Clodius,  destroying h is al ib i . 29 
C icero's role in  the aftermath of that scandal was real ly unnecessary, another 
poor pol itical decision that cost h im dearly . Although he later claimed moral outrage, 
27 Eleanor Goltz Huzar, Mark Antony, a Biography (Minneapolis: U M i n n  Press, 1978) 19-20, 37. 
28 Tatu m,  J .  "Cicero and The Bona Dea Scandal ." CPh 85 (1990) 202-208; 202. 
29 Epste in ,  D. "Cicero's Testimony at the Bona Dea Tria l ." CPh 81 (1986) 229-235; 233. 
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Cicero's early reference to C lod ius'  sacrilege had an amused rather than offended 
tone.30 However, although he states that a friendship once existed between the two 
men,  Epstein bel ieves that Cicero sti l l  harbored d istrust and resentment against C lodius 
for the purported con nection between Clod ius' and Cati l i ne's supporters in 63.31 
Alternatively, Plutarch says that at some point C lodius may even have acted as one of 
Cicero's bodyguards.  C icero claimed that he had actual ly opposed bringing C lodius to 
trial unti l the last minute and had on ly assisted the prosecution half-heartedly.32 Epstein 
states that Cicero believed that it wou ld have been better for C lodius to carry the sta in 
of h is sacrilege rather than be exonerated by a corrupt ju ry .33 In any event, there was 
no pol itical enmity or strong reason for C icero to have involved himself against Clod ius 
in  the resu ltant prosecution of the affair. 
Tatum says that C icero's consulship and Cicero h imself became necessary to 
the prosecution of C lodius because h is actions du ring the Cati l inarian conspiracy made 
Cicero the "vital symbol of senatus auctoritas."34 This may have been good press for 
Clodius' enemies who were pushing for a tria l ,  but sti l l  not an explanation for C icero's 
personal involvement, a lthough th is ego-stroking was probably very intoxicating and 
a l luring to h im. 
C icero would certa in ly have d isapproved of Clod ius'  behavior d u ring a solemn 
rel igious rite , especial ly d ressing as a woman and committing sacrilege.35 Cicero later  
referred to h imself as a champion of  senatus auctoritas for testifying at  the tria l and 
30 Epstein 230; Att.1.12.3. 
31 Att.1.14.5; Epstein 230. 
32 Att.1.16.1-2. 
33 Epstein 231-232. 
34 W. Jeffrey Tatum, The Patrician Tribune Publius C/odius Pulcher (Chapel Hi l l: No.Carolina U P ress, 1 999) 77. 
35 Tatu m,  208. 
1 1  
viewed C lodius' acqu ittal as a travesty of justice that cast aspersions upon the 
'monuments' of his consulsh ip .36 He claimed to have acted to restore the health of the 
Republic. Once again , however, his motives for involving h imself in that circumstance 
deserve investigation .  
Plutarch says that Terentia, Cicero's wife , may have been jealous of Clodius' 
sister, Clodia Metel l i ,  bel ieving that Cicero was attracted to her and may have even 
wanted to marry her. H is testimony against C lodius would prove to Terentia that her 
suspicions were u nfounded . P lutarch suggests another intrigu ing scenario for Cicero's 
involvement. Terentia's sister, Fabia, a vestal virg in ,  may have been prosecuted by 
Clodius for having relations with Cati l ine, a capital crime for the priestess . In any event, 
P lutarch states that C icero's testimony demolished C lodius' a l ib i .37 
I t  is possible that there were other more personal ,  career related, motivations for 
Cicero to volunteer h is services at tria l .  Cicero, as a novus homo, was always aware of 
h is inferior status among the cream of pol itical society and sought ways to ingratiate 
h imself with them.38 Clodius had many enemies among the better people and Cicero 
knew that siding with them m ight elevate h is status. Tatum suggests that Cicero d id not 
fear C lodius in any way as a pol itical opponent or he might have reconsidered his 
involvement in the affair. Tatum concludes, however, that Cicero probably d id not wish 
to destroy Clodius.  He genu inely bel ieved him to be gu i lty of a serious crime against 
society .  Therefore, he was motivated more by unselfish civic responsibi l ity and loyalty 
36 Tatum 205. 
37 Plut . ,  Cic. 29. 
38 David Stockton, Cicero: A Political Biography (London: Oxford U P ,  1 97 1 )  1 6 1 . 
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to the senate's authority than by pol itical self-promotion .39 Some h istorians suggest that 
Cicero's testimony against Clodius constitutes ingratitude if indeed Clod ius had backed 
C icero against Cati l ine.40 
There are on ly two genuine defenses for C icero's testimony: either Clodius' 
actions offended h is moral  sense , or h is bel ief that C lodius had been a Cati l ine 
sympath izer. However, by the time of the tria l ,  Cicero was no longer in  the spotl ight at 
Rome and this was unacceptable to the man who had once saved h is country and 
basked in that g lory. He needed to elevate h imself once aga in among those whose 
influence and approbation he sought. Th is was a golden opportun ity to turn the eyes of 
Rome to a man who was rescu ing her yet aga in ,  this time from moral turpitude. 
Cicero's motivation must have been un important to Clod ius who remained h is 
enemy throughout the latter's l ifetime. C lod ius wanted only to be acqu itted wh ile C icero 
presented h imself as the defender of senatorial authority .41 
CICERO, REJECTION OF A JOB OFFER AND EXILE: SELF-IMPOSED PROBLEMS? 
By 59, because of h is pol itical ambitions, C lodius, with Caesar's help ,  had been 
adopted by the plebeian branch of his own fami ly in order to legally run for tribune, a 
position not open to patricians. He became tribune of the plebs in December 59.42 
Just prior to this t ime, Cicero had declined becoming the fourth member of what evolved 
into the First Triumvi rate of Caesar, Pompey and Crassus. Cicero considered th is 
al l iance a betrayal of the Roman constitution and rule of law. Everitt calls th is the 
39 Tatum, 207-208. 
40 W.K. Lacey, Cicero and the End of the Roman Republic (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1 978) 53. 
41 Lacey 54. 
42 Rawson 1 1 3. 
1 3  
turning point of  C icero's career.43 He had rejected power for ideal ism . C icero had 
sealed his fate . The triumvirs no longer supported C icero's presence in Rome where he 
sti l l  wielded influence in the Senate .44 
C lodius was now Caesar's man . After Cicero had turned down Caesar's offer to 
share power, Cicero now rightly feared C lodius.45 I n  late 59 and early 58 ,  C lodius used 
that fear to manipulate h im into backing bi l ls that Cicero would have considered 
"pern icious . "  Clodius was obviously promising to protect and spare Cicero in return for 
th is assistance .46 C icero cou ld not have approved of the restored right to associate in  
clubs or  collegia , especial ly s ince he had been part of  the Senate six years earl ier when 
they had been banned .  He also would not have approved of C lodius' motion to reduce 
the power of h igher mag istrates, nor his measu re for free grain d istribution to the 
people. 47 While he had been true to his convictions when refusing to support the F i rst 
Triumvirate , he appeared suddenly to have abandoned the welfare of the State to save 
h imself from any retribution Clod ius could th reaten .  
It wou ld seem , however, that C lodius was playing cat and mouse with Cicero 
because, in late January or  early February of 58 ,  Clodius introduced a bi l l ,  re-enacting 
an older law, which den ied fire and water to anyone who had put citizens to death 
without a tria l .  It is more than possible that he was encouraged in th is by Caesar who 
needed Clodius' backing so that Caesar's laws of 59 would not be annu l led . Cicero 
knew that this action was d i rected at h im and his consu late and cou ld find no one to 
43 Everitt 321 . 
44 Rawson 1 3 1 . 
45 Rawson 1 1 1 .  
46 Rawson 1 1 3 . 
47 Rawson 1 1 1 -1 1 3 . 
14 
help h im.  Caesar's explanation for h is inabi l ity to intervene in  Cicero's behalf was the 
fact that he had always d isapproved of the Cati l inarian executions, and had vehemently 
spoken against them at the time.48 
Th is was a desperate time for Cicero and another turn ing point in  h is l ife. As he 
looked around Rome, he real ized that even those who purported to be on h is side d id 
not have the power and influence to change h is fate . They, too , were l iving in  a 
changed Republ ic and were more interested in their own political survival .  They were 
unwi l l ing to chal lenge the new triumvirate in Cicero's behalf. C icero could have waited 
to see how events would cu lminate, but he knew that it was u n l ikely th ings wou ld turn in  
his favor. So he was forced to leave Rome before he was official ly exiled . For eighteen 
months, he l ived in a near su icidal  depression ,  on the verge of a breakdown.49 
Pompey is the worst offender in  this scenario .  I n  several of his letters to Atticus 
prior to h is u ltimate decision to leave Rome, Cicero voices confidence in  his fel low 
consu lars and especially in Pompey as a loyal defender of h is interests . "Pompeius 
tells me not to worry about Clod ius ,  and expresses the most cord ial sentiments towards 
me in everything he says. "50 However, Pompey did nothing to help Cicero except to 
g ive him vague reassurances and in the end tacitly al lowed the exile to happen.51 
Cicero could have anticipated C lodius' revenge as well as h is pol itica l reasons for 
sending h im into exi le. Caesar was no real friend to Cicero , especially after Cicero had 
clearly shown his opposition to the triumvirate's plans . Therefore ,  he cou ld not have 
expected much support from Caesar. He might  even have accepted the lack of action 
48 Rawson 1 1 4-1 1 5. 
49 Rawson 1 1 8.  
50 Att.2.24.5 . 
51 Cicero, Letters to Atticus, Vol. I. Trans.  D .R .  Shackleton Bailey (Cambridge: LCL, 1 999), intro. 7.  
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by many of  h is fel low senators who were protecting thei r  own pol itical futures. He cou ld 
never have predicted Pompey's betraya l ,  especially s ince he had always idol ized 
Pompey and treated him with g reat deference. 
By May 58 ,  Cicero was in  exi le. He had left of h is own accord knowing that the 
exile was inevitable without Caesar and Pompey relenting in  their positions. H is 
decision to leave was h umi l iating ,  costing h im the prestige and auctoritas he had earned 
from h is years in publ ic l ife .52 Upon h is departure ,  Clod ius proposed another bi l l  
condemning C icero whereby al l  of h is property and goods were confiscated . 
Subsequently , h is mansion in  Rome was burned to the g round and h is Tusculan vi l la 
looted . Clodius even accused Cicero of having invented the evidence that condemned 
the Cati l inarian conspirators .  Cicero h imself was forbidden to come with in 400 mi les of 
l taly.53 
Cicero was final ly recal led by the Senate in August 57, although he was never 
exonerated of Clodius' charges nor were Clodius' bi l ls repealed . Cicero's actions were 
simply exempted from those laws .54 Although he was a somewhat broken man ,  the 
reception he received from the people and h is col leagues upon h is return did much to 
lift h is spirits . He began to bel ieve that his return might bring a return of order and 
legal ity to Rome, a m istaken assumption .55 Shackleton-Bai ley points out that Cicero's 
egotistical response to his triumphant welcome home soon al ienated him from some of 
the senatorial leaders .  He seemed to view the triumphant g reeting he received upon his 
return as proof that he tru ly was ind ispensable to Rome. Th is attitude angered and 
5 2  Rawson 1 1 6.  
53 Rawson, 1 1 7. 
54 Rawson 1 2 1 . 
55 Rawson 1 2 1 . 
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disappointed many people who bel ieved that Cicero should have returned a more 
cautious man,  having been properly chastised by the powers that be .56 
Cicero qu ickly learned that not everyone was as exh i larated by h is return as he 
had assumed. The Senate had made restitution to Cicero and his fami ly for the 
confiscation of property by paying for the construction of a new home for Cicero and 
another for h is brother Quintus on the Palatine. Clodius was apparently gu i lty of 
sending men to both s ites to interrupt construction and vandal ize the properties. Cicero 
was subsequently assau lted on the Via Sacra .57 Evidently, C lodius' enmity for Cicero 
had not abated in spite of h is positive reception from others .  Huzar opines that Antony, 
at the t ime sti l l  a confederate of Clodius,  may have been involved in  the destruction of 
the property.58 
Indeed , exile had changed C icero . He now lacked confidence, was unsure of his 
place in Roman society, and did not have a clear view of the pol itical scene in Rome. 
He claimed not to be happy with Rome or with h imself and he was helpless to remedy 
his situation .59 Shackleton Bai ley says that he briefly tried to stay pol itically independent 
and take advantage of any rifts he saw in  the triumvirate , but their pact was reinforced 
at Lucca in 56.60 Pompey then warned h im to watch h is step.61 He had learned from 
hard experience that h is best choice was to stay out of trouble and hope that things 
would change. D ickinson states that Cicero hated h imself for having to make th is 
decision ,  but he should have forg iven h imself because he was not real ly serving the 
56 Shackleton Bailey, 74. 
57 Rawson 1 23-1 26; Shackleton Bailey 77; Att.1.8.3. 
58 H uzar 26. 
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triumvirs .  Although weakened polit ical ly, Cicero was sti l l  extraord inarily bright and 
astute. He stepped to the s ide ,  maintained friendly relations with al l  of  the important 
people, took cases he did not necessarily want and occasional ly made a speech in 
favor of the triumvirate if he bel ieved in what they were doing ,  as he did in regard to 
Caesar's command in Gau l .62 Despite compla ints about h is l ife at Rome to Quintus and 
others during th is t ime,63 Shackleton-Bai ley does not believe he was as uncomfortable 
as he made others bel ieve . For him the "labor of pleading was a labor of love . "64 He 
probably was having a fine time appearing in cou rt and enjoying an active social l ife .  
He was relatively safe since he had removed h imself from pol itics and only appeared 
publ icly at the bar, but not as a statesman.65 I n  a letter to Atticus,  he states: " I  do not 
remember the heights from which I fell but the depth from which I have risen . "66 
The triumvirate became shaky.  Caesar's daughter Ju l ia ,  married to Pompey, had 
d ied in chi ldbirth in 54 , th us loosening the ties holding Caesar and Pompey together. 
Crassus' death in 53 was the real death knel l .  From that time on, Caesar and Pompey 
vied for supremacy in Rome.67 
From May 5 1  to November 50 ,  Cicero was away from Rome as proconsul  in 
Ci l icia.68 Upon h is retu rn to Rome in 49, the situation between Caesar and Pompey had 
worsened . Cicero did not know which way to tu rn .  Both Caesar and Pompey 
considered him a friend.69 Soon after h is return to Rome after his proconsulsh ip ,  Cicero 
62 Dickinson 1 40 .  
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68 Shackleton Bailey 1 04. 
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bel ieved that he might  be able to serve as a negotiator between Pompey and Caesar. 
However, th is plan never came to fru ition .70 
CICERO AND POMPEY, FRIENDS AGAIN: BETTING ON THE WRONG HORSE? 
Cicero was about to make h is next misgu ided pol itical decision .  Cicero had 
always favored Pompey in  spite of the latter's betrayal with regard to his exi le, s ince 
Pompey had also been very instrumental in Cicero's retu rn . Therefore , the combination 
of h is early affection and cu rrent g ratitude made Cicero lean more heavily towards 
Pompey. He also bel ieved Pompey less l ikely to become a tyrann ical despot than 
Caesar. He also must have bel ieved that Pompey had a good chance of emerging the 
victor in  th is civil war. In letters to Atticus, Cicero stated that siding with Pompey was 
the best way for h im to protect h is own pol itical influence; he also would rather be 
defeated with Pompey than victorious with Caesar.71 He u ltimately decided to support 
Pompey, but u rged h im to pursue a cou rse for peace . As it tu rned out, Pompey did not 
desire peace.72 Even after he ascerta ined this ,  Cicero gave h is stau nch support to 
Pompey and now considered Caesar an enemy. 
When Caesar crossed the Rubicon ,  C icero was terribly d iscouraged . because he 
felt that neither Pompey nor Caesar cared about the welfare of the people of Rome; 
they were fighting strictly to win supremacy.73 Cicero then hoped that Caesar would 
al low h im to stay out of politics . At first Caesar apparently not on ly acqu iesced in, but 
7 0  Shackleton Bailey 1 34-1 55.  
71 Rawson 1 86.  
72 Geweke, L .  "Notes on the Political Relationship of Cicero and Atticus from 56 to 43 B . C ." CJ 32 ( 1 937) 471 ; 
Att. 7.8.4.  
73 Rawson 1 92 .  
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was pleased with , Cicero's lack of involvement. However, by March of 49 B .C . ,  Caesar 
was u rging Cicero to return to active pol itics in  Rome and was becoming displeased 
with Cicero's absence .74 U ltimately, Caesar's u nwi l l ingness to permit h im to remain 
neutral reinforced Cicero's loyalty to Pompey, but meanwhile continued to vacillate ,  and 
sought Atticus' advice as to when or whether to join Pompey.75 
C icero u lt imately decided to join Pompey and began to make plans to leave Italy. 
Both Anton ius and Caesar strongly urged Cicero not to do so. Anton ius even made 
veiled threats against Cicero and h is fami ly . Caesar h imself wrote to C icero to d issuade 
him from this action .76 Cicero left from Gaeta to join Pompey's troops in  June of 49.77 
No one had contact with h im for about seven months, when he reappeared in 
Thessalonica, the site chosen by Pompey. Eventual ly ,  he traveled to Pompey's camp in 
Dyrrach ium.  During h is time with Pompey, C icero was frequently ind isposed . On the 
day that Pompey left to follow Caesar, a move that ended on August 9 in Pharsal ia, 
Cicero was once again not wel l  enough to join him. Nonetheless, C icero had cast h is 
die with Pompey and he was stuck with that decision unti l after the Battle of Pharsalus, 
the defeat of Pompey and ostensible end of the civil war.78 
I n  effect, Cicero was once again exiled from Rome, th is time at Brund is ium,  as a 
Pompeiian loyalist .  H is pol itical acumen had fai led h im .  His futu re was in Caesar's 
hands. He needed Caesar's len iency,  forg iveness and permission to return to Rome, 
74 Rawson, 1 94; Shackleton Bailey 1 55.  
75 Shackleton Bailey 1 34-1 55. 
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which was granted in the winter of 48.79 Once again , h is l ife at Rome was unexpectedly 
d ifferent and confusing to h im.  The civil war had taken its tol l  on so many of his former  
associates. Cael ius ,  M i lo ,  Pompey, B ibu lus ,  Cato , among others ,  were gone.80 But, as  
he had before , Cicero d isplayed a resi l iency in  character. He strengthened old 
friendships and establ ished new ones.81 He created a new l ife for h imself in  and around 
Rome. 
Caesar actual ly needed Cicero's support at this point in  Rome. As victor, he was 
now alone and needed to establ ish a new order. C icero was one of the few elder 
statesmen left, and he had always supported the Republ ic and the constitution .  If 
Cicero's voice could be heard in  favor of Caesar and h is policies, Caesar would have an 
easier time consolidating his status.  Cicero was an ex-consul ,  a lawyer ,  an augur, the 
author of De Re Publica and , even better, a former al ly of Pompey. With his friends and 
power of persuasion ,  Cicero would be an ideal supporter of Caesar. Early in  Caesar's 
solo ru le, Cicero may even have deluded h imself into believing that Caesar was sti l l  
th inking of restoring the old constitution .82 Syme viewed that constitution in the context 
of the time as a "screen and a sham ."83 Accord ing to Rawson ,  there is much 
d isagreement among scholars as to whether Caesar cou ld have possibly been leaning 
in  that d i rection .  I t  is just as l ikely that Caesar had always envisioned a type of 
monarchy as h is solution for Rome.84 The fu ndamental  d ifference between these two 
great men was that Caesar wanted a new government, however that final ly emerged , 
79 Rawson 202. 
80 Rawson 203. 
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while Cicero wanted new and better men to run the existing one with new and better 
laws .85 Nonetheless , he continued to have influence ,  socializing with Caesar and h is 
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circle, d iscussing l iteratu re and other cu ltural  topics , and occasional ly using that good 
will to seek favors for friends.86 Cicero contented h imself with h is ideal istic notions of a 
perfect state and survived well with in  the current one. 
Yet Cicero's career after h is consulsh ip seemed to lead h im from one form of 
exile to another. He never regained his self-confidence or h is former h igh status in 
publ ic l ife .  He spoke h is mind to Atticus and a few select others but, outside of h is 
al lusions to the pol itics of the day in  h is forensic speeches , he no longer sought the 
l imel ight of the forum to express h imself. He claimed to be d ishonored by the new form 
of government.87 
THE IDEAL ROMAN: A DREAM, ASPIRATION OR SELF-DELUSION? 
From 46 to 44, when Cicero retired from publ ic l ife , he spent most of h is time 
writing and had essential ly put h imself into voluntary exile from pol itics.88 In th is quasi-
solitude, read ing and writ ing ph i losophy and other treatises, Cicero cemented h is 
thoughts and opinions about how affairs would be conducted in  a perfect republ ican 
state . He bel ieved that th rough these political treatises he had fou nd another way of 
addressing the Senate to del iver h is message that trad itional pol itical values needed to 
be restored .89 This period in C icero's l ife immediately precedes the assassination of 
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Ju l ius Caesar. Th us, it is essential to briefly study how Cicero's pol itical and social 
ideals developed during th is critical period in order to see how they influenced the 
C icero who emerged as a leader after Caesar's death . 
I n  Cicero's opin ion , h is contemporary statesmen were gu i lty of vices that had not 
existed in h is ideal ,  the early Roman Republic. They were jealous and possessed by 
personal hatreds which promoted d issension and sedition and destroyed civic spirit. 
They did not d isplay a p roper sense of responsibi l ity and p laced their own priorities 
above those of the commun ity .90 I n  h is Paradoxa Stoicorum, Cicero also criticized what 
he bel ieved to be the two most sign ificant negative features of his contemporary Rome: 
the frantic desire for money and possessions and the need for their extravagant 
conspicuous spending.  The early heroes of Rome were satisfied with praise and g lory 
for ach ieving their happiness.91 
Cicero believed in  a constitutional  government that promoted justice and 
moral ity . Men were "born for justice" because they were 'amiable' and had the capacity 
to reason .92 Justice is the "foundation of common interest and hence of the state . "93 
Serving the government was a moral  duty and brought out virtus i n  men.94 Further, 
governments should seek to be loved , not feared .95 
Cicero was very specific about the characteristics of the ideal statesman which 
he considered to be the highest cal l ing for a citizen .  Although unable to fulfi l l  everyth ing 
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in every category he set forth , one can be assured that in h is own estimation ,  Cicero 
came closer to fu lfi l l ing the ideal th roughout h is career than any pol itician he had known . 
The ideal statesman should possess wisdom, both personal and pol itical. 
H is l ife shou ld be one of moderation with h is passions held in check. He must bel ieve 
above al l  in justice and , therefore, lead h is l ife with honor and integrity as an example of 
excellence in h is l ife and character. Bribery and corruption should not be able to entice 
h im because he is satisfied with a love for g lory .  He must d isplay manl iness, courage 
and generosity , and make h imself easily avai lable to h is fel low citizens, a lways working 
seriously and energetical ly .  He should possess excel lent publ ic speaking ski l ls for 
persuasion . H is leadership ski l ls ,  both civic and mi l itary ,  should be exemplary .  With al l  
of that, fortuna was essentia l ,  because without good luck, success could not be 
assured .96 
The u ltimate goal was the preservation of the state, the maintenance of law and 
order, and defense against external  th reats.97 Above a l l ,  C icero bel ieved in the 
concordia ordinum, a harmonious cond ition of the social classes govern ing themselves 
through a mixed constitution where equal ity was reached essential ly th rough a caste 
system. However unfai r  th is may seem in the context of our  own view of democracy, 
Cicero was convinced that the laws of Rome were "consonant with the laws of natu re , "  
covering rel ig ious,  social and moral  values.98 
In  De Officiis, Cicero stated that there was noth ing more unworthy in a state 
governed by laws than to depart from the laws and that the essence of tyranny is 
96 Wood 1 78 .  
97 Wood 1 93. 
98 Rawson 1 54 .  
lawlessness.99 Since man is only h uman,  to find one with al l  of the above 
characteristics wou ld be impossible. Therefore, Cicero bel ieved that pol itics was best 
conducted by elder statesmen who were less susceptible to temptation .100 When 
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Cicero returned to his leadership position in  the turmoi l  fol lowing Caesar's assassination 
he was 62 years old, the perfect age for fu lfi l l ing his vision of the ideal statesman . 
It is d ifficult to d isagree with C icero's critics who cal l  h is post-consular career one 
of d isappointments and h umi l iation .  I t  was also one of comparative pol itical inactivity 
and indecision . Were it not for h is letters to Atticus and others,  he would not have been 
as visible to h istory because he was not, thereafter ,  a critical character in the ensuing 
events. However, th roughout h is correspondence, he always seemed to want to be 
more active and involved and,  by blowing the occasional horn , to appear more 
important than he actual ly was . Nonetheless , so many of h is later letters are written 
from places other than Rome, that he obviously spent a g reat deal of time away from 
the city. He never forgot h is g lory days when he had been the savior of Rome. He 
must have regretted h is inabi l ity to recreate that status in h is l ife . 
99 Dickinson 266-270.  
100 Wood 1 8 1 .  
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LIFE AFTER DEATH: CICERO, PRE-PHILIPPICS AFTER THE IDES OF MARCH 
Then , final ly, in the five months after Caesar's assassination ,  C icero's outside 
involvement with the three major factions that would u lt imately lead to civil war and the 
end of the Republ ic,  d rew him out of an almost twenty-year  near retirement from active 
pol itics to undertake the most reckless and dangerous action of h is entire career. 
CICERO AND THE TYRANNICIDES: A NOTHER BAD WAGER? 
On March 1 5  in 44 immediately fol lowing Caesar's assassination ,  Marcus Brutus, 
with bloody dagger in  h is hand , shouted out C icero's name. Cicero had been neither a 
participant nor a conspirator in  th is deed . However, h is consistent opposition to tyranny 
and h is devotion to the constitution and preservation of the Republ ic had made h im an  
inspiration for the men who had decided to end Caesar's reign .101 To them, he 
person ified the Rome they hoped would be re-establ ished .  The conspirators had 
judged Caesar a tyrant who was prepared to be king and they had decided to become 
the Republ ic's l iberators . 
U nti l Caesar's death , C icero had maintained a very cordial  relationship with the 
d ictator. They shared their writing with each other102 and ,  in December of 45, Cicero 
enterta ined Caesar at Puteol i . 103 Yet Cicero immed iately approved of the actions of the 
Liberators on the Ides of March and was wil l ing to act in  their behalf to preserve their 
safety and maintain their status in Rome. 






However, their strategy seems never to have gone beyond the deed itself. As 
Cicero wrote to Atticus from Puteol i  in May of 44, "That affa i r  was handled with the 
courage of men and the pol icy of ch i ld ren . "104 The errors in  action and judgment began 
immediately upon the completion of their  task. The tyrann icides never proclaimed their 
deed an act of heroism that r id the state of a tyrant and restored its l iberty .105 They 
seemed to assume that the people would s imply recognize that they now had a choice 
in government, and would be gratefu l for or  forgetfu l of the necessary murder.106The 
l iberators' lack of foresight permitted them to bel ieve that no one would try to prevent 
the Republ ic from retu rn ing to its pre-Caesarian days . The constitution would return to 
its intended functions and the Senate would re-assume the power it had lost.107 In 
real ity , the conspirators could never have restored what had existed prior to the civil 
war. The Republ ic had real ly become a pipe d ream,  a wisp of its orig ina l  g reatness , 
wh ich cou ld only exist in  d reams and memories. 
The collaborators also erroneously bel ieved that Ju l ius Caesar represented the 
on ly obstacle to the l iberty of the people and ,  upon h is demise, it would rematerial ize in 
perfect form.108 Therefore , the conspirators had decided not to ki l l  Marcus Antonius 
along with Caesar, someth ing Cicero came to regard as their most serious mistake.109 
Antonius' reputation and actions had caused them to bel ieve that he lacked the qual ities 
that wou ld make him a genuine threat to step into Caesar's role.110 I n  add ition ,  for the 
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assassins,  the murder was almost a sacred ritual that went beyond pol itics, symbolizing 
the cleansing of the Republ ic.1 1 1  Accord ing to Appian ,  B rutus declared that he and h is 
col laborators cou ld on ly win the g lory of the tyrann icide with the death of Caesar alone. 
I ncluding Antonius in  their plot would have subjected them to accusations of private 
enmity and min imized the sanctity of their action .  1 12  
C icero knew that i f  ever there were to have been a chance for events to turn in  
favor of the assassins,  they would have had to summon an immediate meeting of the 
Senate . Cicero encouraged them to do this on March 1 6 .  Since the consul ,  Marcus 
Anton ius, had fled , B rutus and Cassius as praetors had the legal right to call that 
meeting .113 It is surprising that they decided against this because they had always 
bel ieved that their command of a majority of the Senate who wou ld approve of the 
assassination and help them re-establ ish an appropriate government was assured .114 
Cicero cou ld not convince them to actively fight any Caesarian opposition , especially 
Antonius.115 On March 1 6 ,  Marcus Brutus did attempt to talk to the people, but h is style 
was too d ry and u npersuasive to reach them . Accord ing to a letter dated May 1 8 , 44 , 
C icero had received a copy of that speech which Brutus was ed iting for publ ication .  
Although respectfu l of their d ifferences in oratorical styles, Cicero was critical of its 
content, mentioning that he had offered to write someth ing for Brutus that he thought 
would have worked better.1 16  The assassins then retreated to the Capitol ine.  They 
wanted to negotiate with Antonius ,  whom they bel ieved to be the legal and rightfu l 
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consu l ,  even though he had essential ly been appointed by Caesar.1 17  They had chosen 
to deal with the person that Caesar's death had made the strongest mi l itary and pol itical 
man in Rome.118  
I n it ial ly they proposed that the Caesarians jo in  them on the Capitol ine to p lan for 
the future.  They approached the matter as if they had the upper hand,  promising that al l  
positions and other remuneration that his fol lowers had received from Caesar would be 
considered 'authorized gifts . '  They accomplished noth ing .1 19  
Although he had fled ,  Antonius was not  sitting id ly by waiting for events to unfold . 
He recognized h is own powerful position and wanted to protect it. On March 1 6 ,  
Anton ius visited Calpurn ia ,  Caesar's widow, i n  order to obtain from her four  thousand 
talents and Caesar's papers . The papers would make it appear that projects Anton ius 
undertook or decis ions he made were backed up by previous memoranda of Caesar. 
He also took 700 mi l l ion sesterces from the Temple of Ops .120 
On March 1 7 , Anton ius cal led a Senate meeting at the Temple of Tel lus close to 
his home, sti l l  unsure of h is own safety. H uzar says that Caesar was stil l "master of 
state" at that meeting and that Antonius ,  as consul ,  establ ished h is domination of the 
state .121 Antonius was extremely clever in his manipu lation of th is session .  He 
managed to appear concil iatory without d imin ish ing Caesar's former status. He 
therefore proposed a compromise whereby al l  of Caesar's acts would be approved . He 
then pointed out that if Caesar were to be considered a tyrant, a l l  of his appointments 
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would be nu l l ified and i l lega l ,  causing many of the members of his audience to lose their 
cu rrent positions and throwing the Empire into d isorder. S ince that declaration could 
not be made without causing tremendous turmoi l ,  Anton ius proposed that the 
conspirators go u npun ished , but also u npraised . I t  was also decided that Caesar's wil l  
should be read and a publ ic funeral  held for Caesar. As a result of the amnesty and 
compromise, all of Caesar's acts and his party survived as if he were sti l l  al ive and the 
l iberators lost their on ly chance of ever holding sway over the Senate aga in .  122 
However, early on ,  Cicero was thri l led with the resu lts of the March 1 7  meeting .  
He praised Anton ius and felt that the best resu lts had been ach ieved through the 
amnesty and was responsible for preventing a possible civil war.123 Antonius had 
remained pol ite and courteous to everyone,  an attitude which he projected for months 
even though relations were becoming strained. 124 Cicero decided to leave Rome and 
return to Puteoli where he could keep tabs on events from a d istance .  It is d ifficu lt to 
understand how Cicero d id not view the Ides of March and its aftermath as an incip ient 
crisis at Rome and how he could bel ieve his presence was no longer needed . Th is very 
wel l  cou ld have been h is real  opportun ity to step in  to preserve what was left of the 
Republic. At that moment in h istory, he was on good terms with all sides. Antonius 
seemed pl iant and avai lable. The tyrann icides were sti l l  in  Rome, anxious to repair any 
rifts and continue in  their  roles as lead ing citizens. Cicero's departure ,  particularly 
before Caesar's fu nera l ,  is at odds with his own view of the appropriate role of a senior 
statesman in  a state that needed help .  
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Perhaps because his name had been shouted out immediately fol lowing the 
murder, Cicero bel ieved that by staying he might be too closely associated with a deed 
that d id not belong to h im ,  especial ly if he lent too much support to its perpetrators. 
Perhaps he had g rown accustomed to a less active role in pol itics existence and was 
not ready to take on a larger role other than that of an al ly to the Republ ican cause. 
Perhaps he trusted that Marcus Anton ius ,  released from Caesar's hold , was genuinely 
working towards a concord that included all s ides of the issues. In any event, if ever h is 
statesmansh ip was needed , it was then and he let an important opportun ity sl ip through 
h is fingers .  
Caesar's funera l  was Antonius' tour de force. He knew that the people loved 
Caesar. He, therefore , played on thei r  emotions ,  remind ing them that the Senate had 
once voted him "al l  the d ivine and human honors at once , "  that he had been sacrosanct 
and that they had pledged to watch over h is personal safety.125 Antonius had cleverly 
arranged for a wax effigy of Caesar, complete with the twenty-th ree stab wou nds he had 
received , to be raised above the a l ready aroused crowd . Mayhem ensued; the Senate 
bui ld ing was razed; the mob went in pursuit of Caesar's slaughterers .126 The people 
had clearly shown the assassins that their l ives were no longer safe in Rome. They 
were forced to secretly leave town . There was no question that Anton ius had ga ined 
complete contro l .  He had removed any fu rther th reat from the tyrann icides and had 
elevated h is own position with the people.127 Anton ius' power now lay in  his position 
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between Caesar's murderers . "128 Caesar was indeed dead, but the Ides of March had 
fai led . and his "worsh ippers 
On April 1 0 , Cicero was sti l l  praising the l iberators .  He pra ised the "heroes" to 
Atticus,  claiming that they had acted gloriously and that al l  that was necessary for their 
future success was money and troops. 129 On April 1 2 ,  he fou nd Anton ius' interview with 
the conspirators satisfactory, but stated that overa ll the on ly th ing that made him tru ly 
happy was the Ides of March itself.13° Cicero was pleased that Caesar's death was 
h igh ly regarded by many as the assassination of a tyrant. However, he felt that Caesar 
might as well sti l l  have been ru l ing since no sign ificant changes had taken place at 
Rome.131 On April 1 6 , Antonius again received praise for the improvement in h is 
relationship with Brutus.132 By April 1 9 , however, Cicero had begun to bemoan the 
inaction of the l iberators , condemning them for not having cal led their own meeting of 
the Senate on the Ides. He had also changed his tone concern ing the decisions made 
on the 1 ih , in particular al lowing the publ ic funeral  held for Caesar.133 On April 22, he 
had begun  to speak of Anton ius' improper  use, and probable forgery, of Caesar's 
memoranda,  and the fact that Octavian had arrived on the scene to claim h is 
inheritance .134 Cicero was in  the perfect frame of mind at that moment to become putty 
in  the hands of the cun n ing and u nderestimated young Octavian .  
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CICERO AND OCTAVIAN: ERROR IN JUDGMENT OR NESTOR'S AGAMEMNON? 
The character of Octavian was seriously misjudged from the moment he 
appeared on the scene to claim h is inheritance .  Gaius Octavius, great nephew and 
adopted son of Ju l ius Caesar, took on the name Gaius Ju l ius Caesar Octavianus.  
Because of the uncertain  and potential ly dangerous pol itical cl imate, Octavian's mother 
and stepfather tried to d iscourage the youth from leaving home and accepting the 
inheritance. However, Octavian was determined to enter the fray and immediately 
confront his future.1 35 Considering his later actions at the end of the civil war and h is 
u ltimate role as princeps, he must have possessed a great deal of charm and the abi l ity 
to convincingly d issemble so that no one seemed to sense h is genuine feel ings and 
goals .  I t  was on ly later that his innate· intel l igence and talent for manipu lation became 
apparent. 
History shows that Octavian did not emphasize h is relationship to Caesar. He 
was clear and resolute about h is u ltimate goals and was in  no special hurry to reach 
them . He was able to mainta in a certain modesty about h imself without losing sight of 
the end.136 There is someth ing almost sociopathological  about Octavian's behavior. He 
seemed to have had the abi l ity to ignore any social conscience or moral  responsibi l ity 
towards those with whom he al l ied h imself from his arrival on the scene up to and 
including h is triumviral a l l iance with Antonius and Lepidus. He could make al l iances 
and break them, make friends and u ltimately sacrifice them . He kept h is emotions, if he 
had any, out of his decisions. He had no problem with betrayal because it was exactly 
1 35 Syme 1 20-1 22.  
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what he expected of  others.137 I n  the end , he wanted power and glory for h imself and 
he was wil l ing to play both parties, Caesarian and Ciceron ian ,  against each other. 
Cicero was one of the first people to be won over by the 1 8  year old youth who 
appeared at h is home in Apri l ,  44 . In a letter dated April 1 9 , Cicero told Atticus that 
Octavian had arrived in Naples, determ ined to accept h is inheritance , but aware that 
Antony might be an obstacle for h im. 138 By April 22 in  Puteol i ,139 the friendly and 
respectfu l Octavian was a l ready with Cicero who , at that moment, was a l ittle wary 
about the young man's future. He was also unsure of Octavian's entourage who were 
clearly negatively d isposed to the conspirators. Octavian could never  be a bonus civis 
because he was too young ,  related to Caesar and surrounded by Caesarian zealots .140 
I n  add ition ,  he could never tru ly al ly h imself with the conspirators and save the 
Republ ic. Apparently, Octavian worked on Cicero , flattering his van ity , asking for advice 
and Cicero , unaware of Octavian 's inner strength and determination ,  viewed Octavian 
as a tool to be used against Antonius.  Octavian made Cicero bel ieve that he would be 
compl iant to h is advice and loyal to the republican cause.141 He even convinced Cicero 
that he respected and admired the conspirators .142 Accord ing to Mitchel l ,  Cicero 
bel ieved that, under h is tutelage, Octavian would be the new leader of the concordia 
ordinum after Caesar's death . I n  June ,  Cicero clearly stated to Atticus that he was not 
sure how much faith to put in Octavian because of h is youth , name and fami ly heritage, 
and h is education .  Cicero had apparently spoken with Octavian's stepfather recently 
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who apparently d id not th ink very h ighly of the lad's capabi l ities . In spite of that opin ion , 
Cicero stil l bel ieved that Octavian needed to be encouraged and , above a l l ,  kept away 
from Antonius.143 Nonetheless , C icero's loyalty was clearly bound to Octavian long 
before he del ivered the first Philippic. I ndeed , C icero's new confidence in  h is own 
leadership role after September 44 was due in large part to h is confidence in Octavian's 
loyalty .  
Octavian arrived in  Rome in  May 44 intent on cla iming h is inheritance.  Anton ius,  
who was in possession of a l l  of the money from Caesar's legacy, was d ismissive , 
confident that he was deal ing with a mere nu isance, someone of no consequence to 
h imself. However, confident in the people's affection for h is father, Octavian soon made 
it clear that he, Caesar's heir, had been disrespected . He decided to use whatever 
resou rces he possessed to fu lfi l l  the legacy in Caesar's wil l  leaving money to the 
people. Caesar's estate included lands that Octavian proceeded to sel l  in  order to 
come up with those funds and d istribute them . The people saw the effort he was 
making and the lack of assistance he was getting from Antonius and h is cohorts.144 I n  
add ition ,  it now appeared that the money came from Octavian personal ly rather than 
Caesar's  bequest. 145 Anton ius was wel l  aware of how Octavian 's publ ic activities were 
designed to hurt his reputation .146 
But Antonius h imself was doing an excellent job of injuring h is own reputation at 
Rome. He had su rrounded h imself with armed men and then , in June 44 , held a secret 
armed and guarded meeting in wh ich he changed the assignments of provinces that 
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had been confirmed back in  March .147 Th is move would especial ly affect Decimus 
Brutus who was to be replaced in  C isalpine Gaul  and moved to Macedonia without h is 
troops, which would be added to Antonius' when he arrived in  the province 148. In  late 
April, Cicero revealed Atticus' awareness of the inside mach inations at Rome. Cicero 
had learned from Atticus about Anton ius' plans to hold a meeting on the Kalends of 
June to effect the provincial reassignments. 149 On May 24, Cicero, in referring to 
Antonius' upcoming meeting ,  said that his action could incite war if Brutus were 
deprived of h is province. And on that date, C icero stated that he personal ly d id not 
want war.150 
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With some of  h is  newly acqu i red funds, Octavian decided to  g ive games in honor 
of Caesar. In  late Ju ly ,  he put together the ten-day Ludi Victoriae Caesaris which also 
honored the goddess, Venus Genetrix, Caesar's ancestor. Accord ing to Appian and 
other Roman historians, a comet appeared n ightly in  the sky above the games unti l i t  
d isappeared on the last n ight. To the superstitious Romans th is was a sign of Caesar's  
d ivin ity and the clever Octavian immediately cap ital ized on its sign ificance by placing a 
star above the heads of al l  of Caesar's statues in Rome.151 Octavian had cut deeply 
into Antonius' popularity and had won the people's trust and affection .  
Th is widespread popularity influenced Octavian to become a candidate for 
tribune of the plebs. Antonius could not permit this to happen and violently disrupted 
the elections that had a l ready begun .  He also forbade Octavian from speaking in  
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publ ic.152 I t  was clear that these two men could not co-exist with in  the Roman 
government. 
Octavian real ized that he was on his own and had to use his name and money to 
get an army, Republican al l ies and leg itimate backing .153 Anton ius was the true soldier 
and the loyalty of Caesar's troops had immediately sh ifted to him after Caesar's death . 
However, the army had been outraged by Caesar's murder and ,  accord ing to Appian,  154 
blamed Antonius for not having immediately avenged the crime. They ind icated that 
they would be wi l l ing to avenge the crime themselves if they could find someone to lead 
them . Therefore , Octavian's need for an army coincided beautifu l ly with the army's 
wil l ingness to sh ift its loyalty in  honor of Caesar. 
Octavian and Decimus Brutus both had the money and influence to gather their 
own troops, Brutus in Gaul and Octavian in  Italy. Antonius and Octavian were now in 
competition for Caesar's men.155 Octavian had a l ready met with Caesar's troops on his 
arriva l at B rund is ium,  wh ich was a publ ic declaration that he was more than Caesar's 
personal heir but intended to wield pol itical power as wel l .  Octavian clearly u nderstood 
that Antonius' March 1 7  compromise had not taken the army into consideration .156 He 
offered five hundred denari i  to each soldier who joined h im .  Antonius,  unaware of 
Octavian's offer but knowing that he had to seduce the men to stay loyal to h im,  offered 
only one hundred . The result was open mutiny among Antonius' troops which he dealt 
with by slaughtering many of them in  the presence of his wife , Fu lvia.157 Everitt bel ieves 
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that i t  was Octavian's popularity with the army and ,  especia l ly, with the people that 
u ltimately pushed h im to detach h imself from close relations with the Senate and set out 
to overthrow Decimus Brutus in Gau l .158 
The sold iers unsuccessfu l ly tried to reconcile Antonius and Octavian before a 
complete rift was effected .159 However, it would never have been to Cicero's or  the 
Senate's benefit for the two men to become true al l ies since that would clearly negate 
anyth ing gained from the Ides of March .  Cicero became aware of Octavian's active 
recru itment and was in favor of it because, by th is t ime, he had come to view Antonius 
as dangerous and desirous of tyrann ical power. Octavian had started to court C icero , 
u rging h im to join his revolt against Antonius and come to Rome.160 Accord ing to 
Boissier, there were orig inal ly th ree books of correspondence between Octavian and 
Cicero .161 Boissier emphasizes that Cicero had never approached Octavian to help the 
Republ ic. I t  had been Octavian who had come to h im and he apparently wrote to 
Cicero every day, even cal l ing h im "father. "162 Octavian needed Cicero's help in h is 
mission to overth row Antonius,  who was clearly and legally the highest official in  Rome. 
Cicero did not real ize that the underly ing motive for al l  of Octavian's actions was his 
desire to u ltimately avenge Caesar's assassination by using the Republ icans, and then 
betraying them .163 Cicero was not ready to return to Rome. He headed for Arpinum, 
content in his bel ief that Octavian would cause trouble for Antonius and weaken him.164 
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Accord ing to  Appian ,  the Senate d id  not trust Octavian because of  h is  money 
and sold iers ,  wisely bel ieving that he would not be content as a private citizen .165 In the 
late autumn,  Octavian wanted the Senate to legitim ize his actions in behalf of the 
Republic. He claimed to be freeing Rome from Anton ius' tyranny .  He made an anti-
Republican speech in which he demanded h is father's honors and status. Before the 
Senate cou ld act on his demands,  he learned that Anton ius' army was approach ing 
Rome. The sold iers, real izing that Octavian wanted to fight Antonius rather than 
avenge Caesar's murder, would not fight the opposing leg ions. Octavian lost the loyalty 
of many of his sold iers at that time.166 Prior to th is stand , C icero had received a letter 
from Octavian offering h im leadership in the Republican cause aga inst Antonius.167 
CICERO AND ANTONIUS: AN ENMITY WITHOUT A CAUSE? 
Antonius is the most pivotal character in the analysis of what overcame and 
motivated Cicero to embark on the road to the Philippics i n  wh ich he vehemently 
opposed and attacked h im .  Cicero's life experiences and decisions certain ly shaped 
the man who reappeared to energetical ly gu ide the Republ ic to its u ltimate doom. Yet it 
is the figu re of Antonius that seemed to have been the red flag to Cicero's bu l l .  M itchell 
and Syme are d iametrica lly opposed in their opin ion of the relationship between the two 
men.  Syme insists that there was "no ancient g rudge" between them. I n  fact, there was 
what could have been cal led a friendship .168 On the other hand , Mitchel l  asserts that 
there never was a friendship .  Cicero had always despised Antonius and found h is 
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l ifestyle abhorrent and moral ly d isgracefu l .169 Therefore, i t  is essential to examine how 
far any h istory between them m ight have d riven Cicero to what cou ld be viewed as 
fanaticism .  
Antonius' stepfather, Publ ius Cornel ius Lentulus Sura,  was the ch ief conspirator 
along with Cati l ine at the time of C icero's consulship .  He was executed in the 
Tul l ianum,  and it is said that Cicero personal ly escorted h im there . 170 The 
constitutional ity of that execution was always in  q uestion .  However, for Anton ius ,  there 
was more involved on a personal leve l .  As stated earlier, there is some question as to 
whether Antonius h imself was a Cati l inarian sympath izer. Even were he not, the 
execution of Lentu lus was certa in ly a fami ly tragedy. H uzar states that Antonius' 
relationship to Lentulus could have engendered bitterness towards Cicero . In addition , 
it may even have sparked the friendship of Caesar and Anton ius . 171 Cicero probably 
bel ieved that Antonius and some of h is friends were on the sidelines of the Cati l inarian 
conspiracy .  Therefore ,  Cicero may have resented Anton ius for years prior to any 
personal confrontations with h im .  
Cicero may also have been aware that Antonius had taken part in the destruction 
of h is and h is brother Qu intus' property. It makes perfect sense that Antonius ,  because 
of his close friendsh ip with Clodius and a need to avenge what he deemed h is 
stepfather's un lawfu l execution ,  wou ld have g ladly participated in  th is destructive 
misch ief. 
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The friendsh ip between Antony and C lodius, however, came to a bad end in the 
Forum one day after a riot that had probably been incited by C lodius and his cohorts. 
Antonius attacked Clod ius with a sword , which caused a permanent rift between 
them .172 After the tussle, Antonius announced that he had felt obl igated to avenge 
Clodius' spiteful attacks on Cicero . H uzar th inks that Anton ius' statement wou ld have 
greatly amused many in Rome. However, there are other l ikely scenarios for the 
conflict. At the time, Caesar was very powerfu l and Antonius was trying to curry favor 
with h im .  Clod ius had been Caesar's man,  but he was becoming unmanageable.173 
Anton ius may have seen him as a rival for status in  Caesar's  entourage and ,  therefore, 
used an excuse to weaken him in publ ic. It had also been rumored that Antonius was 
having an affai r  with C lodius' wife,  Fu lvia, who later married Anton ius .  
I t  was probably to Cicero's pol itical advantage to  behave as if he trusted the 
sincerity of Anton ius' motive , compl imenting h im as his "noble and gal lant friend . "174 
Cicero had been a man without a country and needed to find a way to exist comfortably 
in  Rome after his exi le.  He was probably aware of Antonius' growing closeness to 
Caesar and was trying to erase any remnants of resentment from 63. However, 
Antonius' later marriage to the wife of a former enemy cou ld not have sat well with 
Cicero , especia lly because Fu lvia was known to be a strong woman who exerted 
tremendous influence on her men .175 
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Antonius became very usefu l to Caesar du ring the civil war with Pompey. On 
more than one occasion , Caesar left Anton ius behind to ru le at Rome wh ile he was 
away. Everyone must have known Cicero's pol itical lean ings,  but Caesar needed h is 
presence in Rome. C icero sti l l  had tremendous prestige and wielded sign ificant 
influence in  ltaly .1 76 Caesar had left instructions with Anton ius to court Cicero so that he 
would wi l l ingly stay in the country .  However, Antonius preferred to carouse and,  
therefore, never personal ly approached C icero . Instead,  he wrote him a letter which , 
though claiming devotion ,  also contained veiled threats. He emphasized to Cicero that 
Caesar had always done more for him than Pompey. He then made subtle th reats 
against Cicero's daughter, Tul l ia ,  and her husband , Dolabel la ,  after wh ich he ordered 
Cicero to stay in I ta ly because it was Caesar's wish .177 
Antonius' behavior was in  d i rect contrad iction to what Caesar had commanded 
and it d rove Cicero to Pompey. Cicero apparently blamed Caesar's choice of agents as 
reason enough not to trust his pol itical aspirations. H uzar judges that Cicero join ing 
Pompey was a "well-deserved b low to Antonius" since he had not fulfi l led his 
responsibi l ity to Caesar.178 
When the civil war was al l  but over and Caesar had left Rome to pursue Pompey, 
he again left Anton ius in charge,  th is time for over a year.179 Again Antonius was 
proving to be a less than perfect leader. Without Caesar, no elections were held and 
Anton ius' relationship with the current senators ,  priests and other magistrates had 
deteriorated . Anton ius had also been instructed by Caesar to treat the return ing 
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Pompeiians with clemency.  I nstead , Antonius,  who probably had been admon ished for 
h is earl ier fai lure,  was anyth ing but clement. He would not let Cicero return to I taly, 
unaware that Cicero actual ly had Caesar's permission to do so. I n  add ition ,  Antonius,  
who had not changed his stripes , was sti l l  carousing with his actor friends and 
frequently making a publ ic spectacle of h imself.1 80 
Therefore , under Antonius' less than watchful eye , riots erupted in  Rome. Upon 
h is return , Caesar was furious with Antonius and publicly denounced h im.  Antonius 
responded bri l l iantly by apparently sending an assassin after Caesar.1 81 
C icero must have borne tremendous resentment towards Antonius for h is 
treatment of h im during and at the end of the civil war. An incip ient grudge was in the 
making .  I ndeed , Cicero must have taken a g reat deal  of satisfaction from the rift 
developing between Caesar and Antonius .  
I n  h is th i rd consulship in 46, Caesar promoted Lepidus as co-consul rather than 
Antonius.  Although Antonius had failed Caesar through h is own devices and vices, he 
must have bel ieved that h is behavior towards Cicero was one of the seeds of h is 
problems. 
At about this t ime, in 47 or 46, Antonius married Fu lvia , a woman whom Cicero 
considered "cruel and g reedy."1 82 Many agree that she must have encouraged Antonius 
to change his l ifestyle because, in  44, Caesar final ly named Antonius as h is co-
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consul .183 H uzar even states that, under Fu lvia's influence ,  Anton ius may have begun 
to resent Caesar's pol itical career and megalomania.184 
Nonetheless , Antonius had become Caesar's most trusted fol lower. He was 
flamen dialis of the cult of Caesar and leader of the Luperci /ulii. 185 And , of course, it 
was Anton ius ,  in the semi-nude at the Lupercal ia in February ,  who several times offered 
Caesar the crown . Although he refused it , "with affected modesty, "  Caesar was 
considered compl icit in th is performance and it u ltimately cost h im h is l ife .186 
Cicero was in  Rome on the Ides of March . He certain ly was aware that, after 
Caesar's assassination , Antonius was Rome's legitimate leader. Anton ius wisely 
appointed Dolabella as h is co-consul to avoid any hostilities between h imself and 
Dolabella. Caesar had already officially named Dolabella second-in-command at Rome 
during his upcoming Parth ian campaig n .  The consul  Antonius had orig ina l ly protested , 
questioning the legal ity of the appointment.187 However, after the assassination ,  
Antonius had made an excel lent pol itical decision .  
When Antonius had recovered from h is in it ial fear  and shock immediately 
following Caesar's assassination , he in itial ly proved h imself to be a very competent 
consul .  Even Cicero praised some of Anton ius' early actions, such as the abolit ion of 
the dictatorsh ip and strong measures taken aga inst people who were petitioning for 
d ivine honors for Caesar. Antonius' clever recal l  of Pompey's son ,  Sextus ,  was a stroke 
of genius .  Appian says th is made the Senate trust and praise h im .188 Although the 
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recall of Sextus Cloel ius, a henchman of C lodius, was a less than popular move, 
Antonius d id write to Cicero pol itely requesting his approval of that decision .  Obviously, 
he would have done it anyway but, then at least, Antonius was stil l seeking the path of 
least resistance with Cicero as an al ly .189 
Frisch and Syme agree that Antonius must be viewed outside the confines of the 
Philippics to avoid being m isled by C icero's interpretation of events and people.190 Both 
H uzar and Syme compliment Anton ius for h is mainta in ing calm during the days after the 
assassination .  He proved that he was a skil led statesman ,  demonstrating strength and 
stabi l ity .191 H is admin istration of affairs was far superior to that of Caesar du ring h is first 
consulsh ip .  There seemed to have been much less violence and corruption .192 
Everitt even bel ieves that Anton ius had Republican incl inations ,  viewing Pompey as the 
model for peacefu l supremacy.193 
From the end of April to early June,  Frisch points to three centers of energy at 
Rome: Antonius,  Dolabella and Octavian .194 During that same period of time and 
beyond,  the absent C icero , watch ing affa irs from a d istance, seemed to be confl icted in 
h is opin ions and experiencing mood swings in  h is g rowing aggravation with Antonius .195 
Frisch says that Anton ius never wanted to clash with the tyrann icides, had g reat 
respect for Marcus Brutus and was completely behind a compromise .196 His 
subsequent actions seem to negate that conclusion and even suggest that Octavian 
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concurs with Frisch , asserting that Antonius had no q uarrel with the l iberators as long as 
they d id not interfere with h is ambition to become the u ndisputed leader of the 
Caesarian party.197 As it turned out, it was not the l iberators who were in contro l  of the 
fru ition of Antonius' aspirations. The contest for primacy among the Caesarians wou ld 
u ltimately be between Octavian and Anton ius. 
Anton ius' inst inct to visit Calpurn ia and immediately secure whatever money and 
documents she had was not, in itself, a nefarious deed . He had inherited the position of 
leadership in Rome and had to have whatever was necessary for h im to effect a smooth 
transition .  M itchel l  mainta ins that Antonius had a fine working relationship with the 
Senate. The Senate trusted Anton ius soon after Caesar's demise with broader powers 
to publ ish Caesar's acta than Cicero ind icated in  either Philippic 1 .3 or  2 . 9 1 .198 
However, h is later use of those papers comes into question , especially since they came 
with the use of Caesar's secretary, Faberius,  in  whose hand many of Caesar's acta had 
been written .  Antonius was suddenly in  possession of what amounted to absolute 
power and he took fu l l  advantage of that position.  He g ranted decrees, spent money 
frivolously, reca lled exiles who would never have been welcomed by Caesar, and 
registered i l legitimate Senate decrees.199 Natural ly Cicero wou ld have become 
outraged learn ing of Anton ius' a l leged misappropriation of Caesar's money and acta . 
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He also might have been d isagreeably reminded of Antonius' post-civil war purchase 
and abuse of the murdered Pompey's confiscated property.200 
Huzar's interpretation of Anton ius' ambition does not necessarily have to be 
taken negatively. She states that Antonius needed to secure enough power to protect 
h imself and attain  control in o rder to successfu lly govern the empire.201 Whether 
Antonius was d riven by ambition and powerlust, th is was h is new and rightfu l 
responsibi l ity . Anton ius' performance at Caesar's fu neral was also in  h is best interest. 
I n  add ition to removing the conspirators from Rome, it solid ified concord among the 
optimates and underscored the need for the consu ls' controlof the situation .202 
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When Antonius left Rome at the end of April to start new veteran colon ies in  I ta ly, 
he left Dolabel la in Rome. Dolabella continued the reconci l iation pol icy that had begun 
on March 1 7  and,  to prove h is  sympathy with the Republ ican cause, took harsh 
measures against Caesar's partisans.  Dolabella's behavior made Cicero extremely 
happy. He wrote worsh ipfu l letters to Atticus and to Dolabel la, extol l ing his former son-
in-law to such an extent that Atticus apparently scolded him for going overboard .203 
I t  was in June that Anton ius' actions became overtly suspicious. He cal led a 
meeting at which very few senators were present, without the requ isite 1 7-day legal 
notification .  Questionable laws were enacted without auspices being read . This is the 
meeting about wh ich Atticus had warned Cicero in wh ich the change of provincial 
management was ratified . In add ition, ostensibly to cover their tracks, Dolabella and 
Antonius appointed themselves members of a commission to investigate Caesar's acta. 
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Perhaps their worst mistake was the passage of a lex agraria , a law that cou ld never 
meet with the approva l of the optimates i n  the Senate .204 F rom June 1 51 on ,  Antonius 
conducted none of his business through the Senate , but went through the people and 
their  tribes.205 Although their  actions were viewed by some as tyranny, u nder the 
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circumstances, the consuls were constitutional ly entitled to wide d iscretionary powers in 
the face of crises.206 For instance ,  Syme maintains that Anton ius had every right to 
order Decimus B rutus out of Cisalpine Gaul  and reassign provinces to whomever he 
saw fit.207 
As stated earlier, Antonius could never real ly attain  primacy as the Caesarian 
leader as long as Octavian was in  the pictu re .  Octavian was his competitor for the 
Senate, the plebs and the veterans.  The Senate was becoming more hostile to 
Antonius.  While Octavian appeared to be supporting the Republ ican cause, Antonius 
d ropped any vestiges of a conci l iatory pose . Towards the end of C icero's self-imposed 
retirement, Antonius appeared to be escalating his violent behavior. He had threatened 
a tribune at the October 2nd meeting which was protected by an armed guard .  He 
apparently published a pamph let demanding a tr ial for Caesar's ki l lers in which he 
included Cicero as an accomplice. He accused Octavian of trying to have h im ki l led . 
Cicero bel ieved every negative word he heard about Antonius ,  especial ly the news of 
the assassination attempt. He was becoming bl inded by hatred .208 Cicero was in 
tu rmoi l ,  trying to decide how to respond . He had not attended a Senate meeting or 
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been in  Rome since March 1 ?'h. Accord ing to Geweke ,  Atticus's belief that Cicero cou ld 
be of genu ine help to B rutus in Gaul  final ly pushed Cicero to return to Rome in 
August .209 
CICERO'S RETURN: WHAT WAS HE THINKING? 
From the time he left Rome, Cicero was an  eager audience for news regarding 
the aftermath of Caesar's murder. Once again ,  he was exh ibit ing a lmost constant 
inconsistency and uncertainty in  h is opin ions about the cu rrent pol itical situation and h is 
proper involvement therein . H is letters from this period are those of a fascinated , but 
often horrified , observer who bel ieved he had u lt imately made the wrong decision by 
abandoning Rome after the Ides of March . Cicero had strong opin ions about the 
tyrann icides, stating that the tyrant had d ied but not the tyranny210 and that, perhaps, 
Antonius should have been executed along with h is leader. However, in spite of the fact 
that Cicero was d isappointed in the lack of change in response to Caesar's death and,  
later, in  Antonius'  and Dolabel la's reg ime, none of h is letters prior to the Philippics 
exh ibit the vitriol ic hatred he d isplayed towards Anton ius th roughout those speeches. I n  
fact, it was not unti l Cicero had returned to Rome i n  late August and encountered 
Antonius' wrath that his own emotions seemed to spin out of contro l .  
In  early Apri l ,  Antonius was a selfish buffoon not worth worrying about.211 The 
conspirators were glorious heroes who had restored freedom.212 Octavian might have 
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been expected to attempt a coup d'etat.2 1 3 Yet, on ly a few days later, on April 1 2 ,  
Antonius and Dolabella had become worrisome u nwanted pro-Caesarian leaders,  wh ile 
the action of the tyrann icides, although praised , was proving to be ineffectual .  Cicero 
was appalled by the apathy of the lead ing citizens in Rome, and pleased to be out of the 
pol itical arena.214 On April 1 61h ,  Cicero was pleased that Antonius had won "even 
Brutus' approval , "215 but by the very next day, the quasi designati consules had returned 
to the roles of tyrants.216 While he vacil lated and blamed everyone else for either their 
tyranny or  lack of action and involvement, Cicero was entertain ing Octavian who was 
plann ing to accept his inheritance. Cicero was warily attempting to judge the young 
man's character and value .217 
I n  the months that followed , Cicero continued to receive news from Rome that 
assured h im that a civil war was in the offing .  This on ly increased h is apprehension and 
indecision .218 Decimus Brutus was join ing h is troops wh ich made neutral ity impossible. 
Therefore, Cicero debated whether to join B rutus or  Sextus Pompeius at his respective 
mi l itary camp or to pursue a commisionersh ip in G reece . The Greek post would be 
another desertion of Rome and ,  this time ,  of I ta ly .  For some reason ,  Cicero believed 
that Brutus' decisive move put Cicero's l ife in danger were he to remain in Italy. He 
began to make excuses that h is trip to G reece would be for the benefit of h is son 
Marcus. Cicero certain ly seemed concerned about h is own welfare and su rvival at th is 
point .  I ndeed , some aspects of coward ice had entered C icero's musings wh ich , under 
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the circumstances was not un reasonable. A retu rn to Rome would certain ly have 
embroiled h im in someth ing he was as yet unwil l ing to face . 
Cicero admitted to Atticus that he had begun  to humor Antonius ,  since no other 
attitude would have made a d ifference and it was the wiser course of action . I n  fact, in  
responding to Antonius' letter of April 22 with regard to Sextus C lodius' recall from exi le, 
Cicero d isplayed an overly obsequ ious attitude to the consu l ,  even concluding with the 
promise that he would g ladly do whatever was asked or requ i red of h im by Anton ius.219 
Then , as d iscussed earlier, he developed a worsh ipfu l attitude towards Dolabella and 
what, in  Greek, he cal led h is coup.220 He continued to ponder where in the world he 
belonged during th is upheaval and uncerta inty . 
By the beginn ing of May, Cicero reconsidered leaving I taly for Greece on June 
1 0 , having learned that Marcus Brutus ,  rather than attending the Senate on June 1 ,  
was contemplating exi le.221 I n  add ition ,  he had had meetings with Pansa and Hirt ius, 
the chosen consuls for 43, and was un impressed with them both as men and as 
prospective leaders.  He was now more determined than ever to flee and leave Rome to 
her inevitable fate under incompetent incoming leadership .222 At th is point in t ime, 
Cicero appeared to have reconciled h imself to the tyrann icides' impotence ,  the 
impending civil war, and his not involving h imself in any of it. This might have been the 
sanest point in C icero's reaction to the events around h im.  Atticus had always 
d istanced h imself from the pol itics of Rome and yet remained a respected Roman 
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citizen l iving abroad . This was a very appropriate decis ion for a 62 year old man who 
had no taste for the mi l itary and no impetus to fight in the pol itical arena .  
Nevertheless , Cicero continued to d iscuss attending the Senate meeting on the 
Kalends of June,  although he had learned that there cou ld be armed guards,  defin itely 
making the conspirators' appearance there a potential mistake or even disaster.223 I n  
add ition ,  after a subsequent meeting with H i rt ius,  Cicero seemed more heartened by 
H i rt ius' attitude since he had apparently made Cicero h is arbiter during the present 
crisis and in  h is subsequent consulsh ip .  C icero was less trusting of H i rt ius' co-consul  
Pansa.224 Nonetheless, one can almost imagine the l ight of excitement return ing to 
Cicero's eyes at the prospect of advising a future consu l .  Th is position could run a 
close second to actual ly holding a second consulsh ip of his own , 
At the end of May, H i rt ius ,  l ike others ,  was warn ing Cicero of g reat danger should 
the tyrann icides and their sympath izers attend the June 1 meeting .  Cicero d id not want 
to antagon ize Antonius with h is absence which cou ld be taken as a personal offense 
and viewed as d isapproval of the consul 's success. U ltimately, Cicero decided that his 
appearance in Rome would be too dangerous for him. However, he was no longer as 
positive about leaving the cou ntry.225 
Cicero continued to stay in touch with B rutus and Cassius who were insu lted by 
the Asiatic corn commission they had been offered . Appian bel ieved that this position 
was real ly a kindness bestowed by upon the two conspi rators since it would 
acknowledge them as upstanding citizens, g ive them the freedom to travel without the 
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appearance of fl ight and remove them from danger at Rome.226 Nonetheless , B rutus, 
Cassius ,  Cicero and Servi l ia ,  B rutus' mother, were very unhappy with th is prospect and 
Servi l ia eventual ly had it quashed .227 Cicero managed to get h imself appointed to 
Dolabella's staff, a l lowing him the freedom to leave Rome and move around as an al ly 
of the current government.228 
After the corn commission was out of the pictu re ,  Marcus Brutus decided to leave 
for Asia,  rather than risk l iving in Rome.229 Brutus had been Cicero's g reatest hope for 
repairing and ru nn ing the Republ ic. Brutus' decision to abandon Rome and I ta ly had to 
have been a blow to C icero, but also confirmation of h is own decision to do the same. 
On June 20, C icero, reconci led to leaving Rome th rough Dolabella's good g races, 
asked Atticus if anyone cou ld seriously view his departu re as a governmental d uty 
rather than a desperate solution to an insoluble problem . Perhaps the end of h is l ife 
would be better because of this move .230 Yet, in  late June ,  Cicero was sti l l  wavering 
about whether to go forward with his trip , mention ing a Ju ly 301h departu re .231 I n  mid-
Ju ly ,  C icero had decided to ask Brutus if they could travel together, especially since his 
orig inal route through Bru nd isium seemed to be blocked by incoming troops.232 
By Ju ly 25 ,  Cicero had set forth on the first part of h is journey without Brutus, 
having decided to head for Brund isium ,  since the sold iers near there seemed to pose 
less of a threat than the pirates he cou ld encounter on other routes. He bemoaned h is 
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departu re from Ita ly and questioned h is own motivation for leaving at that t ime. He 
assured Atticus that he would return to Rome by the Ka lends of January, 43 .233 
Cicero's next letter is dated August 1 9 . Cicero was just off the coast of Pompei i  
return ing to Italy ,  having received several p ieces of good news. Brutus' and Cassius' 
farewell edict, wherein they declared no hostile intentions towards Antonius ,  preferring 
exile to war, had been del ivered . They were seeking a meeting with Antonius in the 
Senate on the Kalends of September and had invited numerous proconsuls and 
propraetors to attend as wel l .  They hoped to reach a new compromise that would al low 
them to return to Rome. Rumor had it that Antonius was amenable to a compromise 
that included him rel inqishing h is claim to C isalpine Gaul  and submitt ing to the Senate's 
wi l l . 234 
C icero also learned that he was being criticized for h is decision to abandon 
Rome.235 Apparently , Atticus and B rutus were among those critics , accusing C icero of 
abandon ing a sinking sh ip .  Cicero insisted to Atticus that he had final ized his decision 
to travel because of Atticus' encouragement and that they had both agreed that he 
would retu rn by the beginn ing of the new year. Brutus, with whom Cicero had proposed 
to travel ,  was upset with h im for missing the Senate meeting of August 1 ,  which gave 
the impression that he had permanently deserted his country for pleasures such as the 
Olympic games.236 Yet, in spite of h is p leasure at being missed and desired , Cicero 
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insisted that he had defin itely not returned to participate in  pol itics, in spite of Brutus' 
recommendation that he do so.237 
U nfortunately, on August 1 ,  at a Senate meeting also requested by Brutus and 
Cassius wherein they hoped to be released from their praetorial duties but al lowed to 
remain in  Rome for the balance of their terms, matters d id not proceed as expected .  
Because the meeting purported to be  one  of peace and  compromise , many consulars 
attended in  the hope that the future was now secure .  Instead , L. Calpurn ius Piso, 
Caesar's former father-in-law, del ivered a speech in which he verbal ly attacked 
Antonius and h is leadership .238 He mistaken ly was cou nting on tremendous support 
from the returned patriots . However, no one offered any agreement to the sentiments 
he expressed . Interestingly, neither Brutus nor Cassius were in attendance at that 
meeting ,  wh ich may have led Anton ius to bel ieve that they knew about and tacitly 
approved of Piso's outburst. Antonius apparently responded furiously, threatening 
Brutus and Cassius ,  whose answering 'man ifesto' put an end to al l  hope of 
reconcil iation among these men and to C icero's optimistic return .239 
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Cicero's next extant commun ication with Atticus is dated October 24, 44. By this 
time,  the reluctant pol itician had jumped back into action with a l iteral  vengeance. He 
and Antonius had locked horns ,  although not in person .  I n  fact, th roughout the period of 
the Philippics, Cicero and Antonius would never clash in person . It is evident that 
Cicero had protested too much with regard to h is re-entry into the pol itical sphere wh ich 
had tempted h im since h is desertion of Rome after the Ides of March . 
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Between the August 1 9  and October 24 letters, C icero had infu riated Antonius by 
not attending a Senate meeting on September 1 ,  complain ing of fatigue from h is recent 
journey. Of cou rse, Cicero was not anxious to jump immediately into open controversy 
with Antonius,  preferring to watch and wait unti l he had a better handle on Anton ius' 
game plan .  Cicero had also learned of Antonius'  intention to propose that an extra day 
of thanksg iving,  in honor of the divus Caesar, be attached to every publ ic celebration. 
Cicero considered that proposal to be sacri leg ious.240 
Antonius threatened to send housebreakers to Cicero's home to tear it down and 
drag him into the Senate. He also attacked C icero's character during the Senate 
debate .241 Antonius'  response to Cicero's absence on September 1 spurred Cicero into 
action and instigated h is speech of September 2 wh ich came to be known as the first 
Philippic. 
I n  comparison to the speeches that would follow, Cicero held h imself in check 
with regard to his attitude and response to Antonius .  He was as concerned with 
defending his own absence from Rome as he was with attacking and defending h imself 
against Antonius.  He reminded the Senate of his involvement in the compromise that 
immediately fol lowing the assassination and praised Antonius for h is matu re leadersh ip 
in that time of crisis.242 He reminded the assembly that Antonius had abolished 
d ictatorsh ip from the State and brought forward several decrees that seemed to 
encourage peace and compromise.243 He commended Dolabel la's pun ishment of the 
Caesar-worsh ipping fake Marius ,  and stated that, although Dolabella had acted alone, 
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he knew that Antonius would have enthusiastical ly sanctioned and supported h is 
colleague's decision .244 
From that point on ,  however, Cicero's attitude sh ifted . He condemned Antonius '  
June 1 meeting where predominantly un i lateral  decis ions had been made, not v ia the 
Senate, but ostensibly through the people. He noted that the lead ing citizens were 
apparently too frightened to attend.245 C icero then excused h is departure from Rome 
stating that he had bel ieved that the next time he wou ld be needed there was on the 
Kalends of January when the new regime would take over.246 But then he heard such 
good news regard ing the schedu led September 1 meeting that he could not help but 
wish to return sooner than planned .247 
Cicero met with Brutus du ring his journey home only to learn that things were no 
longer amicable with Antonius.  He also heard about Pisa's speech and , in  effect, 
condemned the assembly for not having had the courage to support h im in what, to 
Cicero , was great glory .248 Had Anton ius not attacked Cicero the previous day in his 
absence ,  perhaps C icero might  not have become so defensive of h imself and 
supportive of Pisa.  However, with h is next breath he began to refer to the iniuria 
Antonius had infl icted on h im the previous day and to defend his absence.  He felt pity 
for the senators who had been forced to pass a decree with reference to Caesar, a man 
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unworthy of d ivin ity .249 He then offered tremendous g ratitude to Piso for the speech he 
had felt bound to del iver, however unpopular that m ight be .250 
Although muted in  tone,  the rest of this speech captured through innuendo more 
than cou ld have been accomplished th rough accusation .  Cicero jokingly al luded to the 
acta that Caesar d id not know he had passed .251 Men had been recal led from exi le by a 
dead man;  citizenship had been g ranted by th is same deceased person to individ uals 
and g roups who had not necessarily been favored by Caesar; exemptions had been 
passed by Caesar post mortem to release fu nds.252 Cicero's beautifu l optative with 
reference to the funds in the Temple of Ops, "Pecunia utinam ad Opis maneret!" , is a 
sharp comical aside with the force of a sharpened kn ife .253 
Yet Cicero proceeded to insist that any criticism brought against Antonius was 
that of one loyal citizen against the publ ic deeds of another. Therefore , Antonius would 
be wrong to view C icero as a personal enemy, and h is anger should be tempered by the 
publ ic nature of the topics d iscussed . Also, Antonius ,  who had taken to travel ing armed 
with a personal bodyg uard ,  should on ly employ his arms in  self-defense and not against 
a citizen merely stating h is concern about matters in the republ ic.254 
Cicero then reminded Dolabel la of his g lorious and patriotic handl ing of the 
Marius s ituation wh ich he should view as h is g reatest moment. In the same vein , he 
encouraged Antonius to reca ll h is handl ing of the meeting in the Temple of Tel lus 
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fol lowing Caesar's murder and h is subsequent actions as h is finest hours .255 Therefore , 
Cicero felt bound to question the motivation for and change in  Antonius'  actions and 
goals. He wondered why power and intim idation were more appealing to Antonius than 
praise and love .256 Cicero contin ued to exhort Anton ius to appreciate how much better 
it was to be loved than feared . 
Although he might have been offended and angry at al l  of C icero's previous 
remarks, the vei led threat that followed must have enraged Anton ius.  Having del ivered 
h is friend ly ,  fatherly praise, advice and subsequent concern for the abrupt change in  
Antonius' behavior, Cicero then reminded Anton ius of Caesar's fate . Caesar could not 
have been a happy man knowing that at any time someone might have wished h im 
dead with the hearty approval of  many.  Cicero, in  urging Antonius to make the people 
happy that he had been born , was subtly implying that Antonius was not too far from 
bringing the same deserved end to h is own l ife .257 
Although Anton ius' speech in  reaction to Cicero's is not extant, the second 
Philippic makes clear its vitriol ic content. Anton ius had already been angry with Cicero 
on September 1 .  However, h is carefu l ly composed answer, which took h im unti l 
September 1 9  to del iver was a vicious personal attack on Cicero . He ordered Cicero to 
be present for the September 1 9  meeting in the Temple of Concord , but the orator did 
not attend since he had a lready been threatened with Anton ius' enmity after September 
2 and he, probably rightfu l ly ,  feared for his l ife .258 
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PHILIPPIC II: CICERO EXPOSES HIS NECK AND LOSES HIS HEAD 
The second Philippic, although bri l l iant, is the real turning point in Cicero's 
career. I t  is a lso the beginn ing of the lack of objectivity in Cicero that continued for the 
duration of h is leadership and substantial ly contributed to the end of the republ ic. I t  is 
particu larly interesting that Cicero never del ivered this speech in person even though it 
is written as a timely response to Anton ius' d iatribe of September 1 9 . Shackleton Bai ley 
refers to it as a "pamph let in oratorical form supposed to have been del ivered in 
Antony's presence on 1 9  September."259 Juvenal ,  in  Satire 1 0 , refers to this speech as 
the divina Philippica, Cicero's masterp iece .  Kingsley Amis' schoolmaster, in Take A Girl 
Like You, found this Philippic both boring and fi l led with "nasty si l l iness."260 
C icero had taken h is time composing and waiti ng to publish his own vitriol ic 
response to Antonius.  Sussman bel ieves that Cicero had two objectives to accomplish 
in  the second Phi l ippic: he had to defend his past career, especially in  l ight of Antonius' 
attack of September 1 9 ; he also had to d imin ish Antonius's right to Caesar's status by 
"demol ishing h is motives, methods ,  character and pol itical career."261 Sussman also 
states that rid icu l ing an opponent is the most effective way to attack an opponent.262 
Another point that Sussman makes is that Antonius ,  who was an educated Roman,  
probably was a good speaker and ,  therefore , further inflamed Cicero who proceeded to 
attack Antonius' eloquence among h is other flaws .263 
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Nonetheless, where Philippic I was a reasonable critique del ivered by a very 
recogn izable C icero , Philippic II went too far and Cicero probably knew this. He d id not 
have the courage to face Antonius and del iver it in  person in  spite of the fact that he 
actual ly wanted posterity to bel ieve that he had. We know that it did not make a publ ic 
appearance unti l  after the October 25 letter to Atticus in  wh ich C icero, from Puteol i ,  
requested Atticus' d iscretion in  publ ishing it.264 
Cicero had not yet assumed the helm of the government nor had he lost hope for 
the republ ic.265 I n  fact, on October 28 ,  Cicero was sti l l  referring to Dolabella as a vir 
optimus even though he was sti l l  anxiously awaiting Atticus' reaction to Philipic 11.266 I n  
the first few days of November, Cicero was n o  more decided about h is role i n  Rome's 
futu re than he had been for months.  Octavian had been reporting to him about h is 
mi l ita ry success and C icero was in even more of a quandary as to how to react and 
where to go.267 
On November 5 ,  Cicero was practical ly giggl ing with Atticus over some of his 
j ibes in  Philippic 11 268 and ,  on November 9 ,  he was sti l l  seeking Atticus'  advice as to 
where to go: stay at Arpinum,  move closer or return to Rome.269 By November 1 1 ,  
C icero , encouraged by Atticus,  was contemplating writing  a h istory and seemed almost 
l ighthearted and relatively unconcerned about Rome.270 I n  the final letter of the Atticus 
correspondence dated November 1 2  from Arpinum,  Cicero expressed personal and 
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public d isapproval of Dolabella wh ich he planned to share with as many people as 
possible. However, again C icero's problem seems more personal than pol itica l ,  as 
does h is reaction to it. He was more caught up with financial issues that concerned 
Dolabella and Terentia that would force him to come to Rome.271 He seemed to be 
6 1  
laughing a t  Octavian's speech g lorifying h is father, rid icu l ing the young man's reported 
melodramatic physical gesticu lations. He was almost d ismissive about Octavian's 
successes, add ing that he had not yet come to trust h im and that he d id not bel ieve that 
Octavian would have any true va lue to the republ ic or  h imself unti l after the Kalends of 
January.272 He then reiterated to Atticus that h is major current concerns were financial ,  
not pol itica l .  
Therefore, a lmost two months after Anton ius' verbal attack on h im ,  Cicero was 
stil l seeking vengeance for h is hu rt ego. H is firm decision to go forward with the 
publ ication of Philippic II was l ike that of a vind ictive ch i ld .  Sussman is certa in ly correct 
in his analysis of C icero's goals for Philippic II. However, C icero's motivation for 
continu ing to feel the need to publ icize his own d iatribe rather than working for a 
peaceful resolution ,  which had always been h is wont, is the issue here and the crux of 
C icero's downfal l .  
I t  is d ifficult to bel ieve that Cicero contin ued to feel justified publ ishing this 
personal attack on Anton ius after he had had a chance to re-read and ed it it . He had 
obviously lost perspective and needed to publicly l ick his wou nds with a fu l l  frontal 
attack, although he claimed not to have lost sight of who Antonius was and how much 
27 1  Att. 1 6. 1 5 . 1  ff. 
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power he wielded .273 Cicero simply could not recover from the accusations and insu lts 
Antonius had levied against h im:  Cicero was u ngratefu l to Antonius for having saved h is 
l ife back in 48; Cicero had shown no gratitude towards Caesar for having g ranted h im 
amnesty after C icero had supported Pompey; and ,  especial ly, that Cicero was involved 
in the plann ing and implementation of Caesar's assassination .274 I n  any event, it seems 
foolhardy to have decided to solid ify an enmity with the most powerfu l man in Rome. 
Once Philippic II had been publ ished , Anton ius would have had no choice but to 
consider Cicero a mortal enemy. I t  is written as if being del ivered in person in the 
presence of both Antonius and the Senate. I n  th is second Philippic, Cicero responded 
to Antonius' charges of ingratitude by pointing out how gratefu l Antonius should have 
been for the mi ld tenor and impersonal nature of h is previous speech, wh ich had been a 
beneficium granted by C icero .275 Instead , Antonius had chosen to respond with a 
personal attack that now begged to be answered in  kind with al l  pretense of beneficium 
removed . 
C icero qu ickly d ispel led the need for respecting Antonius as a consul s ince ,  in 
C icero's estimation ,  h is l ifestyle and ru l ing methods did not merit it, nor had he earned 
the title legal ly. In add ition ,  Antonius' attack had bel ittled Cicero's status as a consular, 
especially by bringing up the controversy and events fol lowing the Cati l inarian 
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executions during and after C icero's consulship .  276 Therefore , Cicero launched into a 
defense of h is actions, reminding the Senate that he had acted with its approval .  He 
added that Anton ius' beloved stepfather had been a leader among the conspirators .277 
Unfortunately, the Cati l inarian conspiracy was not the only incident in Cicero's 
past that Antonius attacked . He had done a perfect job of putting C icero squarely on 
the defensive . Antonius impl ied that Cicero had encouraged the murder of Clodius, 
which was borne out by h is subsequent defense of Mi lo. Cicero reminded the Senate 
that, years before,  Antonius had attacked C lodius in the Forum and might have ki l led 
h im had C lodius not barricaded h imself inside a bookstore. I n  add ition ,  no one but 
Anton ius who was caught up in  the present circumstances had ever accused C icero of 
compl icity in that deed before. 278 
Antonius' next al leged exaggeration of h istory was to accuse C icero of causing 
the breach between Caesar and Pompey and, therefore , the resu ltant civil war.279 
Cicero rebutted by stating that it was Caesar who had attempted to sever the friendsh ip 
of Cicero and Pompey.280 I ndeed , Cicero had always u rged peace and reconci l iation 
between the two men and ,  had he succeeded, Antonius would never have atta ined h is 
current status.281 
I n  his determination to vil ify C icero , Antonius also made h im the orig inator of the 
plot to assassinate Caesar. Cicero immediately turned the tables on Antonius by taking 
the false accusation as a compl iment, especially s ince not one of the conspirators had 
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tried to conceal h is involvement in that deed . 282 I n  fact, some men who had not 
participated had boasted that they were part of the l iberation.  Cicero went on to 
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modestly assert that it would d imin ish their patriotism and deserved g lory to take cred it 
for having advised such great men .283 He then began to underscore the instances of 
Antonius' stupid ity. He bel ieved that Brutus' invoking Cicero's name immediately 
fol lowing the murder proved Cicero's gu ilt. He did not understand that everyone who 
considered h imself a patriot and approved of the tyrann icides' action was equal ly gu i lty 
and equal ly triumphant. Anton ius' stupor was particularly evident when he declared h is 
respect for Brutus in the same breath that he accused Cicero of being an accompl ice. 
He obviously could not make up h is mind as to whether the perpetrators were assassins 
or  avengers of l iberty .284 
Cicero had placed h imself in  the perfect position to make a fool of Antonius and 
negate h is al leged enmity and hatred for the l iberators . If Antonius bel ieved the 
conspirators to have been parricides, why had he always spoken of and treated them 
with respect? He had permitted Marcus Brutus to leave Rome for more than ten days , 
wh ich violated a statute . He had al lowed the Apol l inarian Games, which ostensibly 
honored Brutus, to be held . He had assigned provinces to Brutus and Cassius and had 
bestowed upon them al l  of the requ isite provisions and men. In  order to have done 
these things,  Antonius must have viewed these men as saviors ,  not murderers,  and 
therefore worthy of rewards .285 If Antonius could judge these men to be heroes, why 
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would Cicero have to fear being counted among them? Thus,  Cicero expressed h is 
gratitude to Antonius for granting h im such renown .286 
Prior to and during these defensive arguments ,  Cicero had elevated h is own 
character and career and had continued to denigrate Antonius ' .  In an un remitting 
barrage of insu lts regard ing Anton ius' wit and eloquence ,  Cicero managed to score 
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many other points. Antonius'  lust ,  immoral behavior and unsavory friends,  such as the 
actress Cytheris and her entourage ,  were fai r  game.287 However, as b lunt and cruel as 
C icero had intended to be up to that point, it was not unti l he brought up Anton ius' 
survival on the Ides of March that the l ine in the sand was deeply drawn . 
Now that Cicero had made it an approved heroic position to support the 
conspirators, he began to tel l  Anton ius how he would have written the scene. F irst, he 
ren:inded Anton ius that it was common knowledge that he had once been approached 
by Trebon ius to take part in Caesar's  assassination .  Therefore,  Anton ius could be 
viewed as compl icit h imself in the conspiracy s ince he had both never informed Caesar 
about it and had been drawn aside by that conspirator outside the meeting prior to the 
murder. I n  add ition ,  it was Anton ius who had reaped all of the rewards since Caesar's 
death . He had emptied the coffers of the Temple of Ops for h is own personal gain .  He 
had also confiscated all of Caesar's documents and had used them to h is own 
advantage and had freed h imself from debt. Cicero claimed that he was not accusing 
Antonius of ki l l ing Caesar, but that he certa in ly had to cu rrently be in the company of 
men who heartily approved it. In Cicero's scenario,  however, Antonius wou ld never 
286 Phil. 33 . 1 -3.  
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have gotten these opportun ities s ince there would have been two homicides that day, 
omitting Trebonius' intercession .288 
Although many other accusations and defenses followed this portion of the 
speech , Antonius cou ld have stopped read ing right there and have become incensed 
enough never to have forg iven C icero .  Had th is  speech been del ivered in publ ic, this 
could have been the point at wh ich Antonius would have jumped up and attacked 
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Cicero. C icero had accused h im of conspiracy ,  d ishonesty, theft, corrupt ambition and,  
u ltimately , in regretting the fact that Antonius had not been assassinated , had ca lled for 
his death . However, l iteral ly add ing insult to injury, Cicero continued with th is personal 
assault. 
Antonius had somehow become the heir of men he had never known .289 C icero 
addressed him as "homo amentissime. "29° Cicero claimed that he would never want for 
ammunition against Antonius because there cou ld be no end to his vices and 
wrongdoings.291 H uzar states that th is Philippic contained "unsubstantiated i rrelevant 
emotional charge against Antonius' publ ic and private life . "292 Antonius had been a 
homosexual prostitute .293 He had been in co l lusion with C lodius during the latter's 
tribuneship and had conspired with h im in the destruction of Cicero's life and,  later, h is 
property.294 He had come to Bru ndisium and , rather than paying a personal visit to 
Cicero , had sent an insu lting letter and continued to carouse with h is actress and 
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friends.295 He had purchased and abused Pompey's home, a despicable act in the eyes 
of the Roman people.296 He had then ,  in response to being ordered to pay h is debts, 
sent an assassin after Caesar.297 And much worse ,  he had declared friendsh ip for 
C icero and betrayed it. In add ition ,  u n l ike Cicero who had been named pater patriae, 
Antonius had been declared an enemy of the state du ring h is tribunesh ip when he 
vetoed the motion that Caesar d isband h is army.298 Therefore ,  Antonius had provided 
the pretext for Caesar to cross the Rubicon ,  an act wh ich precipitated a catastrophic 
civi l war. In Cicero's eyes, the blood spi l led in  that struggle was on the hands of 
Antonius .  Anton ius was Rome's Helen of Troy, the cause of the state's ru in  and 
destruction .299 And , final ly ,  Antonius had premed itated ly caused Caesar's 
assassination by offering h im the crown at the Luperca/ia. He had brought the crown 
with h im and deliberately tested the feel ings of the Roman people and ra ised the 
suspicions.30° Caesar, who had rejected the d iadem, had been kil led ; Antonius ,  who 
had offered the crown , was stil l a l ive and had claimed that monarch ical  power for 
h imself. Then , when Caesar was out of the p icture ,  Antonius,  although supposed ly 
espousing compromise , orchestrated the ru in of the tyrann icides with his oration at 
Caesar's funera l ,  thereby inciting the wrath of the common people.301 With in  days , 
Antonius h imself was completely out of personal debt.302 
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Cicero clearly wanted people read ing th is speech to bel ieve that he had del ivered 
it in person .  He demanded to know why Anton ius had come to hear the speech with 
guards bearing swords in their hands.  He wanted to know why the Temple of Concord's 
doors were closed when Anton ius' Rome was clearly at war.303 In conclusion , Cicero 
once again threatened Anton ius' l ife by remind ing h im that the Roman people now knew 
how wonderfu l it felt to rid themselves of a tyrant. Cicero declared that he did not fear 
Antonius and was wi l l ing to forfeit h is own l ife if  it would guarantee Rome's l iberty. 304 
I n  late November 44, Antonius returned to Rome with the intention of declaring 
Octavian a publ ic enemy. However ,  he received word that a large number of men had 
committed themselves to Octavian and, alarmed , he left Rome. It is at about th is time 
that Cicero publ ished Philippic II. Since Cicero had not del ivered the speech in  person ,  
h is t iming for its publ ication was excel lent. He had not been able to ride the wave of 
emotions by respond ing in person to Antonius.  Therefore ,  Antonius'  return to Rome in  
November wh ich included drunken behavior, th reats and,  final ly ,  fl ight seemed to offer 
the perfect opportun ity for Cicero to arouse the people's negative feel ings towards 
Antonius.  Soon thereafter, Anton ius proceeded against Decimus Brutus in Gau l .305 
On December 20 ,  the Senate was cal led together by the tribu nes ostensibly to 
d iscuss the incoming consuls on the Kalends of January 43 .  However, Decimus B rutus 
had let the Senate know that he intended to keep C isalpine Gaul  wh ich prompted 
Cicero to attend the meeting and del iver the th ird Philippic in defense of D. B rutus' claim 
to that province. The promise of Cicero's appearance apparently d rew fu l l  attendance .  
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I t  was during th is speech that Cicero first declared Octavian to be Rome's savior against 
Anton ius and reiterated h is lack of regard for Anton ius as consul .  Decimus Brutus and 
Octavian were now Rome's champions and clearly , to C icero , Anton ius was the 
enemy.306 
THE THIRD PHILIPPIC AND BEYOND: DISASTER FOR CICERO AND ROME 
As misgu ided a decision as the publ ication of the second Philippic was, the 
sentiments and bel iefs expressed by Cicero in the th i rd Philippic were tru ly dangerous.  
However, Cicero told Trebonius that he bel ieved the th i rd Philippic to be the true 
beg inn ing of h is efforts to return l iberty to the Roman people.307 I t  was true that Rome's 
government was in flux and there was g reat uncertainty about its future and its rightfu l 
leaders.  Nevertheless, if Cicero and others were able to accept H i rt ius and Pansa, who 
had been appointed by Caesar as consuls for 43, as rightfu l successors to those 
positions, then it seems that they were also obl igated to recogn ize Anton ius as their 
consul  for the year 44 . C icero's h istory with Anton ius and the personal umbrage he 
took from Anton ius' insult ing remarks cost h im objectivity and made him a hypocrite . At 
the very time that Cicero was advocating overlooking the laws , he was writing De 
Officiis in an effort to teach h is son how to be a better citizen .  He knew that it would not 
be in  Rome's interest, from his point of view, for Anton ius and Octavian to ever join 
forces. That would end forever C icero's personal hope that Marcus Brutus would lead 
the republicans and be a buffer between Octavian and Anton ius .308 Cicero had 
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obviously been swayed by Octavian's charm and flattery, so that he was wil l ing to 
overlook the fact that Octavian had raised an army on h is own without the sanction of 
the Senate .  Also , possibly because he bel ieved that he and Octavian could one day be 
co-consuls or that he could be the young man's advisor, Cicero had clearly decided to 
favor Octavian in any confl icts and support h im as Rome's on ly hope for survival .  
I n  any event, the Cicero of  63 would have considered the man he had become in  
44-43 gu i lty of crimes simi lar to those of  Cati l ine's conspirators .309 He had favored the 
assassination of Caesar wh ich , in  itself, was considered treasonous by some. 
However, h is complete d ismissal of Anton ius as consul  and his abi l ity to defy Anton ius' 
ed icts, especial ly with regard to the assignment of provinces, was less defensible. In 
his mind ,  Cicero appeared to have painted Anton ius as pure evi l  and any actions 
brought against h im,  legal or  not, could be considered patriotic. Also , in  a state sorely 
lacking in leadership ,  with on ly seventeen consulars in  the Senate , Cicero ran into l ittle 
opposition to h is agenda. 
Rome was in  tu rmoi l ,  Cicero's hatred of Antonius and affection for Octavian 
spurred him on to assume a leadersh ip position he felt he had always deserved . H is 
ego had not d imin ished with h is years ,  but any sense of moderation certa in ly had . He 
consistent resisted any negotiations with Antonius.  U ltimately , he seemed to believe 
that peace was impossible and that the on ly solution was not tumultus, but be/furn. Th is 
behavior seems to exh ibit a lack of reason in  Cicero who, goaded by personal hatred , 
was no longer capable of making decisions based on objectivity and wise del iberation .  
309 Syme 1 47.  
H is goal was the utter obl iteration of Antonius and he had assumed the role of 
puppetmaster in control of al l  the requ isite strings.  
7 1  
I t  is surpris ing that none of the lead conspirators ever returned to Rome to add 
their voices to C icero's. With Antonius out of Rome and with Cicero leading the Senate , 
they cou ld have helped Rome's anti-Caesarian cause. Instead , they al l  stayed out of 
I taly, with Marcus Brutus criticizing C icero's advocacy of Octavian to Atticus .310 It would 
be interesting to trace their actions and attitudes whi le Cicero was fly ing solo in  Rome, 
especial ly with an  emphasis on whether or  not they noted any serious behavioral  
changes in  Cicero. 
The Philippics became an ever-escalating ,  frequently i rrationa l ,  tantrum for 
C icero . The Senate was impressed with h is consular status and h is wi l l ingness to take 
the reins ,  bel ieving h im to be the same man they had trusted and followed in the past. 
In spite of h is wil l ingness to ignore the laws , make enemies of the cu rrent consuls ,  defy 
consular edicts and aggressively insist on war, Cicero often won the day. However, 
even when Cicero lost in the first round ,  as in the sending of the first embassy to 
Antony, the later negative resu lts on ly strengthened h is resolve and,  unfortunately, h is 
vitriol .  Thus, a lthough Cicero had beg un to question Octavian's loyalty, he continued 
avid ly to support h im in the Senate and to push for Antony's utter defeat. 
After Mutina ,  Cicero and the Senate m istakenly believed that Anton ius had been 
completely defeated and was permanently out of the pictu re.  Th is attitude obviously 
affected the senators who,  showing him no g ratitude whatsoever, excluded Octavian 
and h is men from their consideration , basical ly d iscarding them. Cicero thought he 
3 1 0  Rawson 289. 
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could stil l control Octavian and thus made some attempts to form a coalition with h im in  
the vain hope that he might back the republ ican cause.311 The Senate scoffed at  th is. 
In add ition ,  they d id not put Octavian on the commission to review the legal ity of 
Antonius's consulship nor did they include D .  B rutus and Octavian on the board of 
veteran affairs to hand le land al lotments . Later, they refused to grant Octavian a 
consulsh ip ,  a triumph and any reward for h is troops.312 Octavian knew that his 
relationsh ip with the Senate and Cicero was over and that he was on h is own .313 
Even though the Senate was u lt imately to blame for Octavian joining forces with 
Antonius and Lepidus and forming the Th ird Triumvirate, Cicero had al lowed th is to 
happen .  Although Cicero den ied having said it, Octavian had heard that Cicero had 
always intended to use h im ,  praise and encourage h im ,  and eventually discard h im 
(laudandum, ornandum, tollendum) . He bel ieved what he had heard .314 
From the Ides of March through the last Philippic, Cicero seemed to have lost 
touch with real ity . I n  the end,  he had misjudged the potential power of the tyrann icides' 
action and their abi l ity to repair Rome. Although Octavian 's u lt imate objective should 
have been clear to h im considering who the young man was and how he had arrived 
on the scene, Cicero had underestimated Octavian and succumbed to h is calculating 
charm. C icero's h istory with Anton ius had prejud iced h im to the point that he was 
unable to see the man clearly. He was bl i nded by Antonius' tendency to debauchery 
and wild behavior and ,  therefore , fool ishly ignored his innate intel l igence and d riving 
ambition .  In the cases of both Octavian and Anton ius ,  Cicero neg lected to take into 
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consideration the loyalty of their men and the simple fact that they were the ones who 
had the troops. Because so much commun ication from the tyrann icides and others 
outside Rome came to h im personal ly as if he were head of state, he began to delude 
h imself into bel ieving that he was capable of mi l itary as well as pol itical leadership .  
However, Cicero's Rome was mi l itarily powerless (he had no legions), a fact he 
seemed to forget. 
The last two years of Cicero's l ife seemed to be a d i rect paral lel of the last two 
years of the Republic's existence .  Both were d riven to extreme actions, yet s lowly 
coming apart, fighting for their l ives and final ly d isappearing.  
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